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HIDING IN THE EYE OF THE STORM CLOUD:
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POWERS
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The United States and United Kingdom will soon implement a new
reciprocal international law enforcement data sharing agreement (U.S.-UK
Agreement), the first of its kind under the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of
Data Act 2018 (CLOUD Act), which will enable law enforcement of one
signatory state to directly request data from service providers based in the
other state. The United States says CLOUD Act agreements simply remove
conflicts of law and do not affect its jurisdiction over overseas providers,
claiming these are strictly constrained by the personal jurisdiction
requirement contained within the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause. It is widely believed that that the United States will issue
few, if any, U.S.-UK Agreement requests.
This article critiques this belief, examining the impact of CLOUD Act
agreements at public and private international law, as well as domestic U.S.
and UK law. While the removal of conflicts is a significant private
international law benefit itself, CLOUD Act agreements also allow signatory
states to significantly expand enforcement jurisdiction over overseas
providers at public international law. Under domestic U.S. law, such
expanded jurisdiction does not appear to be meaningfully constrained by the
Due Process Clause, nor would new legislation necessarily be required.
Frequent United States use of CLOUD Act agreements should be presumed.
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I. INTRODUCTION: DIRECT ACCESS MECHANISMS IN OUR
DIGITAL WORLD
A new generation of international “direct access” mechanisms offers
states previously unparalleled opportunities to extend their law enforcement
investigatory data gathering powers extraterritorially to more quickly obtain
data from service providers that are operating in other jurisdictions. The most
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advanced of these mechanisms, and the focus of this article, are bilateral
“CLOUD Act” agreements, promoted by the United States and issued under
its 2018 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act).1 The
first, and so far only, CLOUD Act agreement was signed between the United
States and United Kingdom in 2019 (U.S.-UK Agreement), and is expected
to come into force imminently as of the time of writing.2 While such
agreements are reciprocal—allowing both sovereign states equal use of their
provisions3—it is widely believed that the United States will have little to no
incentive to directly use CLOUD Act Agreements to request data from
overseas.4 This article critiques this belief. It outlines the international law
benefits of CLOUD Act agreements and other direct access mechanisms and
argues that the United States should be considered motivated and capable to
make robust use of CLOUD Act agreements. Just as the U.S.-UK Agreement
will speed up UK law enforcement’s access to data from U.S. service
providers like Google, Facebook, and Twitter,5 it may equally facilitate
access by U.S. law enforcement to that same data, as well as well as
equivalent data from UK providers, such as BT, Virgin Media O2, and
Icedrive.6

1. Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, Pub. L. No. 115–141, 132 Stat. 1213
(2018) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
2. Agreement on Access to Electronic Data for the Purpose of Countering Serious Crime, UKU.S., Oct. 3, 2019 [hereinafter U.S.-UK AGREEMENT]; see HOME OFF., IA NO. HO0383, IMPACT
ASSESSMENT: POLICE, CRIME, SENTENCING AND COURTS BILL 7 (2021) (UK) (noting, as of June 30,
2021, “the [U.S.-UK Agreement] . . . is expected to come into force in 2021.”). For reasons for this delay,
see infra note 144.
3. CLOUD Act § 105, 18 U.S.C. §2523(b)(4)(I) (2018) (requiring that foreign states party to
executive agreements “afford reciprocal rights of data access”); e.g., U.S.-UK AGREEMENT, supra note
2, art. 2(3)(b) (referencing “the spirit of reciprocity in international cooperation”); see Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Just., Off. Pub. Affs., U.S. and UK Sign Landmark Cross-Border Data Access Agreement to
Combat Criminals and Terrorists Online. (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/ opa/ pr/us-and-uk-signlandmark-cross-border-data-access-agreement-combat-criminals-and-terrorists [hereinafter Data Access
Agreement Press Release]; Sujit Raman, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t Just., Remarks to the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (May 24, 2018), https:// www.justice.gov/opa/ speech/
associate-deputy-attorney-general-sujit-raman-delivers-remarks-center-strategic-and.
4. See infra Part 0.C.
5. See, e.g., HC Deb (1 Dec. 2018) (650) col. 594 (UK) (recognizing this).
6. BT describes itself as “a leading communications service provider selling products and services
to consumers, small and medium sized enterprises and the public sector.” Our Company, BT, https://
www.bt.com/ about/bt/our-company (last visited Sept. 5, 2021). Virgin Media O2 is a recently formed
amalgamation of two service providers, “combining the UK’s largest and most reliable mobile network
with a broadband network . . . .” Hello, We’re Virgin Media O2, VIRGIN MEDIA O2, https:// news.
virginmediao2.co.uk/about-us (last visited Sept. 5, 2021). Similarly, Icedrive provides “[t]he next
generation of cloud storage,” ICEDRIVE, https://icedrive.net/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2021), and is “controlled
and offered . . . from . . . facilities in the United Kingdom.” Terms of Service, ICEDRIVE, https:// icedrive.
net/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2021). For a detailed list of UK service providers, at least some of which have
no U.S. operations whatsoever, see Members, ISPAUK, https:// www.ispa. org.uk/members/ (last visited
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This article proceeds in four parts. Part II provides background context,
outlining the CLOUD Act and the U.S.-UK Agreement and its reception. Its
analysis, both in Part II and throughout, focuses on the possibility for
CLOUD Act agreements to be used to facilitate access to stored data through
requests under the U.S. Stored Communications Act (SCA)—and it assumes
these requests would be filed by federal law enforcement in federal courts.7
Part III critiques the belief that the United States has little to no incentive to
seek to directly use CLOUD Act agreements to obtain extraterritorial data.8
It responds to the primary United States’ guidance on the CLOUD Act and
agreements made under it, set out in an April 2019 U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) white paper (White Paper).9 The White Paper argues that
CLOUD Act agreements “only remove potential conflicts of law” and do not
“allow the U.S. government to acquire data that it could not before.”10
Whether U.S. law enforcement may assert jurisdiction over foreign service
providers continues to be based on unchanged constraints under the U.S.
Constitution, the White Paper states—referring to the “personal jurisdiction”
requirement of the Due Process Clause within the Fifth Amendment.11
Responding to this, Part III explains why the United States will be
motivated to channel requests for extraterritorial data through CLOUD Act
agreements. It does so by considering the benefits of CLOUD Act
agreements and similar direct access mechanisms at international law.
Extrapolating from the United Kingdom’s implementation of the U.S.-UK
Sept. 5, 2021).
7. See, e.g., Robert J. Peters et al., Not an Ocean Away, Only a Moment Away: A Prosecutor’s
Primer for Obtaining Remotely Stored Data, 47 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1072, 1094, 1098 (2021)
(similarly assuming that CLOUD Act agreement requests would be made through these and analogous
statutes). While state law enforcement may also seek these orders, federal requests appear to be far more
common. See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703, 2711(4) (as amended following the
CLOUD Act) [hereinafter SCA] (permitting SCA requests to be filed by both state and federal officials
and heard in both state and federal courts). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SEARCHING AND SEIZING
COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (2009), https://
www. justice.gov/ sites/ default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf (summarizing
SCA case law, which predominantly involves federal law enforcement in federal courts).
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY, PRIVACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW AROUND
THE WORLD: THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT 10 (2019) [hereinafter U.S. WHITE PAPER].
10. Id. at 4, 13.
11. Id. at 8, 14; see In re Grand Jury Investigation of Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 & 50
U.S.C. § 1705, 381 F. Supp. 3d 37, 50 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d sub nom In re Sealed Case, 932 F.3d 915
(D.C. Cir. 2019). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law”). The Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to state conduct,
is in similar terms. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of liberty, liberty,
or property, without due process of law”). Federal SCA requests engage the Fifth Amendment. See infra
note 248.
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Agreement, it explains that these mechanisms appear to provide benefits at
both private and international law. First, countries are increasingly enacting
“blocking laws,” asserting limitations on the ability of foreign states to
access data processed by providers within their jurisdiction. These blocking
laws create conflicts of law. A private international law benefit of CLOUD
Act agreements is that they provide a remedy for these conflicts, albeit a
partial one.12 Absent a negotiated resolution between the United States and
European Union (EU), bilateral direct access arrangements may be unable to
resolve the conflicts presented by the blocking statute that U.S. law
enforcement perhaps fear most: the EU General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR).13 Second, law enforcement also frequently face delays in obtaining
data from providers and others beyond their jurisdiction,14 as this commonly
requires using international processes like mutual legal assistance (MLA),
which may take months or years.15 However, as the United Kingdom’s own
approach to the U.S.-UK Agreement indicates, a public international law
benefit of CLOUD Act agreements is that they permit their members to
positively expand jurisdiction over service providers previously beyond their
(jurisdictional) reach, allowing swift access to such data as compared to the
MLA process. Recent U.S. law enforcement experience indicates they will
be motivated to seek both these benefits—if doing so is permissible under
U.S. domestic law.
Having addressed the United States’ motivation in Part III, Part IV
considers its capability to benefit from CLOUD Act agreements as a matter
of U.S. law. While the motivation of U.S. law enforcement to use such
agreements to minimize conflicts of law (the private international law benefit
of these agreements) is debated, its lawful ability to do so is not in doubt.16
Part IV therefore focuses on the lawful ability of U.S. law enforcement to
use the second benefit of CLOUD Act agreements: asserting jurisdiction
over foreign service providers previously outside their scope (the public
international law benefit). The primary argument that this second benefit is
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement
of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119)
1 [hereinafter GDPR]; see also infra note 137 (outlining a related EU law instrument and explaining why
this article focuses on the GDPR).
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part 0.A. Other processes that may be available, such as letters rogatory, may be even
slower. See, e.g., T. Markus Funk, The Key Tools of the Trade in Transnational Bribery Investigations
and Prosecutions: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and Letters Rogatory, in FROM
BAKSHEESH TO BRIBERY: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND GRAFT 547,
551 (T. Markus Funk & Andrew S. Bourtors eds., 2019).
16. See infra Part III.A.
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unavailable, set out in the White Paper, derives from the U.S. Constitution’s
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. This typically requires U.S. courts be
satisfied that foreign persons have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the
United States that the exercise of “personal jurisdiction” over them would be
reasonable.17 It is, however, seriously questionable whether the Due Process
Clause imposes any meaningful restrictions in this context.18 Further,
whether these constitutional restraints protect such foreign service providers
at all is far from clear.19 This part also critiques related arguments that the
ability of U.S. law enforcement to exercise such expanded jurisdiction is
merely theoretical.20 Ultimately, U.S. law enforcement is not bound by the
White Paper’s interpretation and, moreover, may be able to expand
jurisdiction over foreign service providers without any additional legislative
amendments whatsoever.21
This article’s main audience is foreign states considering CLOUD Act
agreements or similar international direct access arrangements. It may also
inform service providers and others seeking to understand the U.S.-UK
Agreement, as well as courts faced with likely jurisdictional challenges to its
use.22 This article hopes to provide two contributions. First, its analysis of
the international law implications of direct access mechanisms seeks to
contribute to ongoing discussions about the merits of these new mechanisms
generally. Direct access mechanisms are not only a United States
phenomenon; the UK legislation enabling the U.S.-UK Agreement envisages
separate bilateral agreements with foreign states,23 and analogous new
Australian legislation is even broader, permitting “multilateral”
arrangements.24 Perhaps most significant are ongoing discussions about
17. See infra notes 76–84.
18. See infra Part IV.A(1).
19. See infra Part IV.A(2).
20. See infra notes 89–90.
21. See infra Part IV.B.
22. William Schwartz, Andrew Goldstein & Daniel Grooms, How the CLOUD Act is Likely to
Trigger Legal Challenges, N.Y.L.J. (Mar. 31, 2020), https:// cdp.cooley. com/wp-content/uploads/ 2020/
04/NYLJ03302020444632Cooley.pdf (“Production orders issued under the Agreement are almost certain
to trigger legal challenges on both sides of the Atlantic that will raise novel issues of domestic and
international law.”); Rebecca Niblock, On Its Way: The UK-US Bilateral Data Access Agreement,
KINGSLEY NAPLEY: CRIM. L. BLOG (June 19, 2020), https://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/insights/blogs/
criminal-law-blog/on-its-way-the-uk-us-bilateral-data-access-agreement#page=1 (“Once [COPOA is] in
force, the inevitable teething difficulties with interpretation and legal challenges are likely to lead to initial
delay . . . .”).
23. Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Act (COPOA) 2019, c. 5, §§ 1, 4 (UK); see HOME OFF.,
IA NO. HO0315, IMPACT ASSESSMENT: CRIME (OVERSEAS PRODUCTION ORDERS) BILL 3 (2018) (UK)
(“The legislation may enable wider data sharing agreements with other foreign countries leading to an
improvement of international relations and information sharing to combat serious crime.”).
24. Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Act 2021 (Cth)
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similar direct access mechanisms within the EU and between the State
Parties to the “Budapest” Cybercrime Convention,25 administered by the
Council of Europe (CoE).26 The data these mechanisms seek to facilitate
access to are widely viewed by these countries and bodies as “critical” for
“investigations of serious crime” in today’s digital world.27
This article’s second contribution arises from its focus on the United
States. As the current home of the bulk of the world’s leading service
providers,28 the United States is predicted to become the center of a “huband-spoke” model of direct access mechanisms.29 Australia is already
negotiating a CLOUD Act agreement with the United States, and New
Zealand appears similarly motivated to take this step.30 Related EU-U.S.

sch 1 pt 1 s 3 (Austl.).
25. Proposal for a Regulation for the European Parliament and of the Council on European
Production and Preservation Orders for Electronic Evidence in Criminal Matters, COM (2018) 225 final
(Apr. 17, 2018) [hereinafter European Commission Proposal]; Council of Europe, Cybercrime
Convention Committee, Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on Enhanced Cooperation and Disclosure of Electronic Evidence, CM(2021)57-final (Nov. 17, 2021) [hereinafter Second
Additional Protocol]. See generally Computer Crime Convention Between the United States of America
and Other Governments, Nov. 23, 2001, T.I.A.S. 13174, E.T.S. 185 [Budapest Convention].
26. See The Council of Europe and the European Union: Different Roles, Shared Values, COUNCIL
OF EUR., https:// www.coe.int/ en/web/portal/european-union (last visited Feb. 1, 2021) (stating all EU
member states are also members of the Budapest Convention, although Budapest Convention
membership extends more broadly around the globe to include Canada, Japan, South Africa, and others).
27. See U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 2; HOME OFF., EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM TO THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON ACCESS TO
ELECTRONIC DATA FOR THE PURPOSE OF COUNTERING SERIOUS CRIME ¶ 1 (2019) (UK) [hereinafter UK
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM] (referring to such data as “a vital source of evidence for the investigation
and prosecution of serious crimes”); European Commission Proposal, supra note 25, at 1 (suggesting
that EU member state law enforcement “require access to data” overseas “in a growing number of
criminal cases”); Second Additional Protocol, supra note 25, at 4 (similarly noting “evidence of any
criminal offence is increasingly stored in electronic form on computer systems in foreign, multiple or
unknown jurisdictions”); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 5 March
2020, 2647 (Alan Tudge, Member of Parliament) (Austl.) (“Crucial electronic evidence—from messages
between violent extremists plotting terrorist attacks, drug syndicates planning major imports to child
exploitation material shared on online platforms—is often stored out of Australian agencies’ reach.”).
28. See U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 2.
29. Bertrand de la Chapelle, Territoriality and the Cross-Border Internet: Three Exemplary
Challenges, in HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN THE DIGITAL AGE: JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES 123–25
(2020).
30. Joint Statement Announcing United States and Australian Negotiation of a CLOUD Act
Agreement by U.S. Attorney General William Barr and Minister for Home Affairs Peter Dutton, U.S.
DEP’T. OF JUST. (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-statement-announcing-united-states
-and -australian-negotiation-cloud-act-agreement-us; see N.Z. GOVERNMENT, CYBER SECURITY, WHY IS
NZ CONSIDERING JOINING THE BUDAPEST CONVENTION? 2–3 (2020), https:// consultations. justice.
govt.nz/policy/budapest-convention/user_uploads/2.-why-is-nz-considering-joining-the-budapest-conve
ntion.pdf (referring to New Zealand possibly signing a CLOUD Act agreement with the United States).

COCHRANE MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

160

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

4/10/2022 9:48 PM

[Vol 32:153

negotiations are ongoing.31 Other jurisdictions, such as Switzerland, are also
evaluating the potential of CLOUD Act agreements.32 This article may be of
interest to all countries and regions seeking to understand the benefits and
risks of CLOUD Act agreements—or, indeed, any similarly structured direct
access mechanism. Ultimately, if nations wish to move forward with such
agreements they should do so with the full knowledge that these agreements
are reciprocal and on the assumption that the United States, as well as any
other foreign counterparts, may well make frequent use of them to directly
compel data from service providers based in counterpart states.
II. CLOUD ACT EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND RECEPTION TO
DATE
This Part first outlines the CLOUD Act, explaining its impetus and
effect. It then discusses the U.S.-UK Agreement. Finally, it elaborates the
conventional wisdom, driven by the United States’ repeated comments, that
U.S. law enforcement have little motivation to seek data using CLOUD Act
agreements and, indeed, limited ability to do so as a matter of U.S. law in
any event.
A. The CLOUD Act
This discussion begins with the CLOUD Act, described by its Senate
sponsor “as a tremendously important bill that will help to solve the problems
that have arisen in recent years with cross-border law enforcement
requests.”33 This legislation, enacted in March 2018, “accomplished two
things.”34 First—the focus of most commentary—it added 18 U.S.C. § 2713
31. Joint US-EU Statement on Electronic Evidence Sharing Negotiations, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST.
(Sept. 26, 2019), https:// www. justice.gov/opa/ pr/ joint- us- eu-statement- electronic-evidence-sharingnegotiations. See generally Theodore Christakis & Fabien Terpan, EU-US Negotiations on Law
Enforcement Access to Data: Divergences, Challenges and EU Law Procedures and Options, 11 INT’L
DATA PRIV. L. 81 (2021) (providing “the context of these [EU-US] negotiations and the numerous
challenges surrounding them”).
32. DÉPARTEMENT FÉDÉRAL DE JUSTICE ET POLICE [FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND
POLICE], RAPPOT SUR LE US CLOUD ACT (LOI CLOUD) (SEP. 17, 2021) [REPORT ON THE U.S. CLOUD
ACT (CLOUD LAW)] (2021) (Switz.); see, e.g., Dep’t of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
Canada, CLOUD Act, GOV’T OF CAN. (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/trnsprnc/
brfng- mtrls/trnstn-bndrs/20191120/034/index-en.aspx (briefing the incoming minister on the CLOUD
Act, and noting that certain Canadian law enforcement have “expressed support for Canada entering
negotiating with the [U.S.] with the aim of concluding a CLOUD Act agreement,” but redacting proposed
next steps).
33. 164 Cong. Rec. S596 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2018) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). I provide a more
detailed description of the background to the CLOUD Act and U.S.-UK Agreement elsewhere. Tim
Cochrane, Digital Privacy Rights and CLOUD Act Agreements, 47 BROOK. INT’L. L.J. (forthcoming
2022) (manuscript at 7–24) (on file with author).
34. Richard W. Downing, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Delivering Remarks at
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to the SCA.35 The SCA “creates a set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy
protections by statute” for stored data held by U.S. service providers.36 It
limits the bases by which such providers may voluntarily disclose user data
and regulates the methods by which the U.S. government may compel
disclosure.37 The SCA’s new § 2713 now requires service providers subject
to U.S. jurisdiction to disclose data pursuant to SCA requests “within such
provider’s possession, custody, or control, regardless of” the data’s
location.38 This addition famously mooted the then pending U.S. Supreme
Court Microsoft Ireland litigation.39 Whether § 2713 simply “restor[ed] the
widely accepted and long-standing understanding of U.S. law,” as the United
States claims,40 or actively expanded the SCA’s reach extraterritorially, is
debated.41 In any event, § 2713 confirmed Congress’ intention to provide the
SCA broad extraterritorial scope over data.42
As its second accomplishment—and the focus of this article—the
CLOUD Act allows the United States to enter into bilateral executive
agreements with foreign states to facilitate law enforcement data sharing

the Academy of European Law Conference on “Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation on the Transfer
of Electronic Evidence to Promote Public Safety” (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/ opa/ speech/
deputy-assistant-attorney-general-richard-w-downing-delivers-remarks-academy-european-law
[hereinafter Downing, ELC speech].
35. CLOUD Act § 103(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 2713 (2018). See generally Stored Communications Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–13 (as amended following the CLOUD Act).
36. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1212 (2004).
37. Id. at 1212–13; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–03; e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288
(6th Cir. 2011); In re Search of Info. Associated with Four Redacted Gmail Accts., 371 F. Supp. 3d 843,
844–46 (D. Or. 2018) (upholding a challenge to an SCA warrant on the basis that it was overbroad).
38. CLOUD Act § 103(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 2713.
39. See generally In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017),
vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
40. U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 7.
41. Compare, e.g., Roxana Vatanparast, Data Governance and the Elasticity of Sovereignty, 46
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 27 (2020) (“The CLOUD Act expanded the territorial reach of the SCA”), with
Peter Swire & Jennifer Daskal, Frequently Asked Questions About the U.S. CLOUD Act, CROSS-BORDER
DATA F. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/ V2KY-NAMK ([“T]the U.S. CLOUD Act did not expand the
territorial reach of U.S. law, under the DOJ’s unchanging view and, in the view of the authors, the most
likely prior reading of the law.”).
42. This extraterritorial scope is broad both relatively, compared with the position previously
prevailing following the Second Circuit judgment below, see In re Warrant, 829 F.3d at 222 (“[T]he SCA
does not authorize a U.S. court to issue and enforce an SCA warrant against a United States-based service
provider for the contents of a customer’s electronic communications stored on servers located outside the
United States.”), and practically, given the extent to which data relevant to criminal investigations is
currently predominantly held by U.S. service providers. See Andrew Keane Woods, Mutual Legal
Assistance in the Digital Age, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 661–62 (David
Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 2017).
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through a new statutory mechanism codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2523.43 CLOUD
Act agreements arise in part from dissatisfaction by law enforcement about
the effectiveness of the main existing method that law enforcement have to
obtain overseas data: MLA.44 Like CLOUD Act agreements,45 MLA “is
based on reciprocity”; each state provides the same level of assistance they
expect to receive in return.46 However, access to data through MLA often
takes months or even years,47 in part because an MLA request from one
country must normally be reviewed by, and executed under the law of, the
state in which the data and/or service provider is based.48 In contrast, direct
access mechanisms claim to “reduce this time period considerably”49 by
allowing their members to use their own local law to compel data from
foreign service providers operating in other member states.50 This article uses
the term “foreign service providers” relatively, to refer to providers who are
predominantly operating beyond the jurisdiction of a requesting state (which
may have some or no connection with that requesting state). This new
CLOUD Act mechanism was summarized by Professors Jennifer Daskal and
Peter Swire—commonly viewed as “prominent advocates” of this new
model51—as follows:
Countries that sign executive agreements with the U.S. no longer need to
go through the [MLA] process to request communications content from
U.S.-based providers; rather they can, pursuant to a long list of substantive
and procedural safeguards, directly request the data from U.S.-based
providers, so long as they are seeking the data of foreigners located outside

43. CLOUD Act § 105(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2523.
44. See generally NEIL BOISTER, INTRODUCTION TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 311–22 (2d
ed. 2018) (outlining mutual legal assistance (MLA) and similar mechanisms); U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just.
Manual § 9-13.000 (2020).
45. CLOUD Act § 105(b), 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(I).
46. BOISTER, supra note 44, at 311.
47. UK EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 27, ¶ 2; U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 3;
e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGIES 226–27 (2013) (expressing various concerns with MLA).
48. See BOISTER, supra note 44, at 311 (noting that a “requested state” during MLA “uses its own
power to do something for the requesting state” under its “local law” and that MLA “can be long-winded
and bureaucratic”).
49. Data Access Agreement Press Release, supra note 3.
50. See, e.g., U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 11 (“[T]he framework envisaged by the CLOUD
Act [is] that each nation would use its own law to access data.”); see also Richard W. Downing, Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen., Delivering Remarks at the 5th German-American Data Protection Day on “What
the U.S. Cloud Act Does and Does Not Do” (May 16, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputyassistant-attorney-general-richard-w-downing-delivers-remarks-5th-german-american
[hereinafter
Downing, Germany speech].
51. E.g., Haleform H. Abraha, Law Enforcement Access to Electronic Evidence Across Borders:
Mapping Policy Approaches and Emerging Reform Initiatives, 29 INT’L J.L. INFO. TECH. 118, 136 (2021).
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the United States. Conversely, those governments must commit to
ensuring that U.S. law enforcement can directly request communications
content from their local providers—also enabling the United States to
bypass the otherwise applicable [MLA] process.52

B. The U.S.-UK Agreement
The United States and United Kingdom signed the U.S.-UK Agreement
in October 2019.53 Announcing it, (then) U.S. Attorney General William
Barr stated that “[t]his agreement will enhance the ability of the United States
and the United Kingdom to fight serious crime . . . by allowing more
efficient and effective access to data needed for quick-moving
investigations.”54 As noted above, the U.S.-UK Agreement is the first and so
far only “CLOUD Act” agreement to date, and is yet to come into force.55 At
international law, it will allow each state to directly enforce its own legal
orders for preservation, disclosure, and interception of electronic
communications against service providers in the other jurisdiction.56 It
achieves this through a “core obligation”: each state agrees to remove all
“blocking statutes” in their domestic law that may otherwise prevent service
providers from lawfully responding to requests from law enforcement.57 The
SCA ordinarily functions as such a blocking statute, normally prohibiting
U.S. service providers from disclosing electronic communications content,
other than to U.S. law enforcement.58 The UK Investigatory Powers Act
52. Jennifer Daskal & Peter Swire, A Possible US-EU Agreement on Law Enforcement Access to
Data?, JUST SECURITY (May 21, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 56527/ eu-agreement- law-enforc
ement- access-data/ (emphasis added).
53. U.S.-UK AGREEMENT, supra note 2, at 17.
54. Data Access Agreement Press Release, supra note 3.
55. See supra note 2.
56. U.S.-UK AGREEMENT, supra note 2, arts. 1(10)–(11), 2(1), 3(1)–(2), 6(1), 10(1)–(2), 10(6).
While this may be the effect of the U.S.-UK Agreement at international law, as explained below at Part
III, countries signing such agreements may be constrained from issuing such requests as a matter of
domestic law. This point is addressed in relation to the United Kingdom below at Part III and in relation
to the United States at Part IV.
57. U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 4; UK EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 27, ¶¶
7–8; Data Access Agreement Press Release, supra note 3; HL Deb (20 Nov. 2018) (794) cols. 139–40
(UK) (statement of Baroness Williams).
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–02; see STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45173, CROSSBORDER DATA SHARING UNDER THE CLOUD ACT 11 (2018) (referring to the overarching legislation
containing the SCA and the Wiretap Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2501 et seq. (2018), as a blocking statute). The term “blocking statute” refers to any “conflicting legal
obligations” that “prevent disclosure” in this context. See U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 3, 10–11;
UK EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 27, ¶ 8. Arguably, given the immunity provisions
explored in Part III, the purported effect of the U.S.-UK Agreement is even greater than lifting blocking
laws; it also appears to remove the need for service providers to consider any domestic law that would
normally govern their conduct when responding to a foreign law enforcement request under a CLOUD
Act agreement, including compliance and similar laws that may slow, but not necessarily restrict,
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2016 (IPA) operates similarly.59 As a result, foreign law enforcement seeking
data held by service providers subject to U.S. or UK law, respectively,
typically need to use MLA.60
The U.S.-UK Agreement was subject to negative resolution periods in
the UK Parliament and U.S. Congress, although these periods have both
expired without objection.61 Since July 8, 2020, the countries have therefore
been free to implement the agreement through an exchange of diplomatic
notes.62 Although the responsible UK Minister announced in September
2020 that implementation was expected by the end of that year,63 this has
been delayed due to data protection concerns, as explained below.64 At the
time of writing, the U.S.-UK Agreement is expected to come into force
before the end of 2021.65
C. Perceived Impact On U.S. Investigatory Powers
Discussion to date has focused on incoming requests to U.S. global
service providers from the UK and other foreign states.66 There has been
almost no consideration of how these agreements facilitate outgoing U.S.
disclosure.
59. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, §§ 3, 11 (UK); see HL Deb (20 Nov. 2018) (794) cols.
139–40 (UK) (statement of Baroness Williams) (referring to the Investigatory Powers Act as a blocking
statute). Other UK laws may have a similar effect. E.g., Computer Misuse Act 1990, c. 18 (UK); see LAW
COMMISSION, SEARCH WARRANTS, 2020-1, HC 852, ¶ 18.40 (UK); see also infra text accompanying
notes 133–143.
60. UK EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 27, ¶ 2; U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 3,
10–11.
61. See Paul Greaves & Peter Swire, New Developments for the UK and Australian Executive
Agreements with the U.S. Under the CLOUD Act, CROSS-BORDER DATA F. (July 19, 2020), https:// www.
crossborderdataforum.org/new-developments-for-the-u-k-and-australian-executive-agreements-with-the
-u-s-under-the-cloud-act-2/ (“The 180 days for Congress to disapprove the agreement expired on July
8 . . . .”); Agreement, Done at Washington on 3rd October 2019, Between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on Access to Electronic
Data for the Purpose of Countering Serious Crime, UK PARLIAMENT (Jan. 20, 2021), https://api. parl
iament.uk/view/treaty/bjKV1oDq (“Parliamentary procedure concluded, Government can ratify treaty.”).
62. U.S.-UK AGREEMENT, supra note 2, art. 16; Greaves & Swire, supra note 61.
63. See 10 Sept. 2020, Draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public
Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2020 Deb (2020) col. 4 (UK) (statement of
Minister for Security, James Brokenshire) (“[W]e are now in the final phases of entering the agreement
into force, which we expect to happen later this year”).
64. See infra note 144.
65. See supra note 2.
66. E.g., Eddie B. Kim, U.S.-UK Executive Agreement: Case Study of Incidental Collection of Data
Under the CLOUD Act, 15 WASH. J. L., TECH. & ARTS 247 (2020); PETER SWIRE & JUSTIN HEMMINGS,
AM. CONST. SOC’Y, OVERCOMING CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE CLOUD ACT 6–14 (2020);
Jennifer Stisa Granick & Neema Singh Guliani, New Bill That Would Give Foreign Governments a Fast
Track to Access Data, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 13, 2018), https:// www.justsecurity. org/ 53705/ bill-giveforeign- governments-fast-track-access-data/.
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law enforcement requests to UK service providers.67 This dearth of
commentary appears to have been driven by United States’ statements,
including in the White Paper.68 Government “white papers” typically outline
actual or proposed government policy.69 Here, the White Paper, published
by DOJ in April 2019, “describes the interests and concerns that prompted
the enactment of the CLOUD Act and provides a concise point-by-point
distillation of the effect, scope, and implications of the Act, as well as
answers to frequently asked questions.”70 The United States and United
Kingdom acknowledge that the U.S.-UK Agreement theoretically provides
the United States “reciprocal access, under a U.S. court order, to data from
UK[] service providers.”71 However, in the White Paper and other
statements, these countries suggest that the United States is unlikely to make
any significant use of the U.S.-UK Agreement itself, i.e. by using it to request
data from UK service providers.72 The main United States benefit, they say,
is that the U.S.-UK Agreement will reduce strain on U.S. MLA processes, as
the UK will no longer clog this up with MLA requests for evidence held by
U.S. service providers.73 Professor Theodore Christakis reported that, at an
67. The main exception comprises a series of short blog posts between Albert Gidari and Professor
Jennifer Daskal debating the potential for U.S. law enforcement to issue extraterritorial wiretap requests
to UK service providers. See Albert Gidari, Can the US-UK CLOUD Act Agreement Be Fixed?, CTR. FOR
INTERNET & SOC’Y (Nov. 18, 2019, 1:07 PM), http://cyberlaw. stanford. edu/ blog/2019/11/can-us-ukcloud- act-agreement-be-fixed (linking to the earlier blog posts); see also Peters et al., supra note 7, at,
1092, 1096–98, 1113–15 (providing a high-level analysis of how U.S. prosecutors could hypothetically
use the U.S.-UK Agreement to obtain overseas data). There is nonetheless a generalized fear of the United
States’ potential use of CLOUD Act agreements by many outside the United States, as I have discussed
elsewhere. Cochrane, supra note 33, at 29–37.
68. See infra notes 76–77.
69. White Paper, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993); e.g., Image Online
Design, Inc. v. Core Ass’n, 120 F. Supp. 2d 870, 873 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“The DOC White Paper is a
statement of policy from the United States Department of Commerce”). Perhaps more commonly, a white
paper represents an “intermediate” step towards policy development, often publicly released for
consultation prior to drafting, rather than, as here, an explanation of a finalized document. See Paper:
White Paper, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
70. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Just., Off. of Public Affs., Justice Department Announces
Publication of White Paper on the CLOUD Act (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.justice. gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment- announces-publication-white-paper-cloud-act [hereinafter DOJ Announcement].
71. Data Access Agreement Press Release, supra note 3; see also OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
DEP’T OF JUST., AUDIT OF THE CRIMINAL DIVISION’S PROCESS FOR INCOMING MUTUAL LEGAL
ASSISTANCE REQUESTS AUDIT DIVISION, NO. 21-097, 18 (2021) [hereinafter DOJ IG AUDIT] (“The
CLOUD Act requires [its] Agreements to be reciprocal, so the U.S. would also be able to issue requests
for data held by CSPs in foreign countries under the Agreements.”).
72. UK EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 27, at 5; U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 5;
see The Overseas Production Orders and Requests for Interception (Designation of Agreement)
Regulations 2020, SI 2020/38, reg. 2(b) (UK) [hereinafter UK Designation Regulations] (“[I]t is
anticipated that the [U.S.] will make considerably less use of the Agreement as fewer UK CSPs offer their
consumer services on a global basis.”).
73. UK EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 27, at 5; U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 5.
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October 2019 public conference, “representatives of [DOJ] could not
provide any example where the US, under current law, would need to use the
Agreement (instead of the CLOUD Act) to gain access.”74 One of the same
DOJ representatives appeared to rationalize this by stating that “the vast
majority of major service providers are already in the territory and
jurisdiction of the United States.”75
The United States has expressly denied that its jurisdiction over service
providers has been impacted either by the CLOUD Act (typically referring
to the SCA’s new 18 U.S.C. § 2713)76 or by agreements made under it.77
Although the term “jurisdiction” is used in many different ways,78
jurisdiction in this context refers to whether a U.S. court has “personal
jurisdiction” over that provider and thus can legitimately compel compliance
by that provider with an SCA order.79 The United States says that “the
CLOUD Act does not expand [U.S.] jurisdiction . . . nor do CLOUD Act
agreements create new obligations under U.S. law for service providers,”
whether U.S. or UK-based.80 According to the White Paper, whether a
foreign company is subject to U.S. jurisdiction continues to be a “fact-

74. Theodore Christakis, 21 Thoughts and Questions about the UK-US CLOUD Act Agreement:
(and an Explanation of how it Works–with Charts), EUR. L. BLOG, (Oct. 17, 2019), https://
europeanlawblog. eu/ 2019/10/17/21-thoughts-and-questions-about-the-uk-us-cloud-act-agreement-andan-explanation-of-how-it-works-with-charts/ (referencing Richard W. Downing, Deputy Assistant Att’y
Gen., Remarks during Privacy + Security Academy Forum Panel: ‘Globalization of Criminal Evidence’
(Oct. 15, 2019)). The reference to “the CLOUD Act” is presumably to the SCA’s new 18 U.S.C. § 2713.
See supra text accompanying notes 35–38.
75. Downing, ELC speech, supra note 34; see Woods, supra note 42, at 661–62, 663 n.9.
76. U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 8, 14, 17 (“[T]he CLOUD Act did not give U.S. courts
expanded jurisdiction over companies.”); Downing, Germany speech, supra note 50 (“Nothing in the Act
expands the categories of providers subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Nothing in the Act alters who falls under
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts . . . .”). Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2713 had a jurisdictional impact in the
(differing) sense of expanding the scope of data that SCA orders may compel from providers already
subject to U.S. jurisdiction is debated, as noted above. See supra note 41.
77. U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 5, 13 (stating that “CLOUD Act agreements do not impose
any new obligation on foreign [service providers] to comply with a U.S. government order” nor “allow
the U.S. government to acquire data that it could not before,” and they “do not alter the fundamental
constitutional and statutory requirements U.S. law enforcement must meet to obtain legal process for that
data”); see also DOJ Announcement, supra note 70 (similar); Downing, Germany speech, supra note 50
(“CLOUD Act agreements . . . would not impose any new affirmative obligation either on other
countries’ providers to comply with U.S. orders, or on U.S. providers to comply with other countries’
orders. They simply remove, on both ends, the conflicts of law.”); see Raman, supra note 3 (noting, when
comparing CLOUD Act agreements to the proposed EU model, that “[t]he CLOUD Act, by contrast, does
not expand jurisdiction over any additional providers.”).
78. See infra notes 165–167 (outlining differing meanings of jurisdiction in U.S., UK and
international law).
79. U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 5. I detail U.S. law of personal jurisdiction, as well as the
related “subject matter jurisdiction” law, at infra Parts III.B(2) and IV.A.
80. U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 5, 14.
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specific inquiry” that is “based on constraints in the [U.S.] Constitution”
requiring “personal jurisdiction” that remain unaltered by the CLOUD Act
or the U.S.-UK Agreement.81 Elaborating on these in the context of the
CLOUD Act, the United States has commented:
The principles of personal jurisdiction are rooted in the U.S. Constitution
and a well-developed body of constitutional law, and they provide for a
strict test before a U.S. court can determine that a particular entity has
‘sufficient minimum contacts’ with the United States based on the nature,
quantity, and quality of those contacts. Those principles are unchanged.82

The United States’ position is that “[t]he only legal effect of a CLOUD [Act]
agreement is to eliminate the legal conflict for qualifying orders.”83 Its claims
about the jurisdictional impact of both the CLOUD Act and potential
CLOUD Act agreements have been repeated in various commentaries and
appear to be widely accepted.84

81. Id. at 8.
82. Downing, Germany speech, supra note 50.
83. U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 5.
84. E.g., Caitlin Potratz Metcalf and Peter Church, U.S. CLOUD Act and GDPR – Is the Cloud Still
Safe?, LINKLATERS: DIGILINKS (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.linklaters.com/ en/insights/blogs/
digilinks/ 2019/ september/us-cloud-act-and-gdpr-is-the-cloud-still-safe (“[T]he [CLOUD] Act does not
impose new obligations on U.S. or foreign communication service providers”); NATASCHA GERLACH &
ELISABETH MACHER, CLEARY GOTTLIEB, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES EXPLORE U.S.
CLOUD ACT’S POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE GDPR 2 (2019), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/
files/ alert-memos-2019/us-cloud-acts-potential-impact-on-the-gdpr.pdf (“According to the DOJ, even
with the CLOUD Act, much remains the same, including . . . the fact-specific analysis a U.S. court must
undertake to determine whether it has personal jurisdiction . . . .”); id. (“[T]he DOJ has also emphasized
that an executive agreement in and of itself would not . . . establish the U.S. Government’s . . . jurisdiction
over service providers . . . .”); Alexis Collins & Destiny D. Dike, DOJ Releases White Paper Addressing
Scope & Implications of CLOUD Act, CLEARY CYBERSEC. & PRIV. WATCH (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://www.clearycyberwatch.com/2019/04/doj-releases-white-paper-addressing-scope-implicationsof- cloud-act/ (“The DOJ’s white paper argues that the CLOUD Act clarifies [service providers]’
disclosure obligations without expanding the U.S. government’s jurisdiction over foreign companies.”);
Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Department of Justice Publishes White Paper on the Cloud Act, 35 INT’L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 150, 151 (2019) (“The only legal effect of a CLOUD agreement is to eliminate
the legal effect for qualifying orders.”); Jim Garland, Trisha Anderson & Alexander Berengaut,
Department of Justice Releases White Paper on CLOUD Act, COVINGTON: INSIDE PRIV. (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://www.insideprivacy.com/cloud-computing/department-of-justice-releases-white-paper-on-cloudact/ #more-9841 (“[T]he FAQ responses note that the CLOUD Act did not give U.S. courts expanded
jurisdiction over companies.”); Alexander A. Berengout & Lars Lensdorf, The CLOUD Act at Home and
Abroad, 20 COMPUT. L. REV. INT’L 111, 113 (2019) (“[T]he [White Paper] state[s] that the CLOUD Act
did not give U.S. courts expanded jurisdiction over non-U.S. persons.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Access
to the Global Cloud, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1751 n.462 (2018) (noting that, under the CLOUD Act
regime, the U.S. may compel service providers in foreign CLOUD Act regime member states to conduct
wiretaps but “[t]hese foreign service providers must, however, be otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of
U.S. wiretap orders.”); see Swire & Daskal, supra note 41 (implying at Q10 and Q15 that direct U.S.
requests to a foreign service provider require that provider to already have “sufficient business or other
contacts with the U.S. to establish jurisdiction”). But see also infra note 89.
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Although the CLOUD Act, U.S.-UK Agreement, and the White Paper
were all produced under the Trump Administration—and policies and
priorities frequently change between administrations85—President Joe Biden
reiterated his commitment to the U.S.-UK Agreement in June 2021 in a joint
public statement with UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson.86 The White Paper
and related materials remain “official CLOUD Act-related materials” on
DOJ’s website.87 There is therefore every indication that the new
Administration similarly considers that CLOUD Act agreements do no more
than lift conflicts.88 A relatively more nuanced position has been set out by
Jennifer Daskal—one of the main academics to have analyzed the CLOUD
Act. Daskal acknowledges that, under CLOUD Act agreements, “the United
States could, in theory, compel production of certain communications
content from providers based in partner foreign countries.”89 Daskal says,
however, that “explicit legal authority in U.S. law” would be necessary to
“enable issuance of these kind of extraterritorial disclosure orders” and that
as of now, no such explicit authority exists.90 This article returns to these
85. E.g., Memorandum from Acting Attorney General to All Federal Prosecutors (Jan. 29, 2021),
https:// www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1362411/download (announcing the rescission and replacement of
the DOJ charging and sentencing policy).
86. See Joint Statement on the Visit to the United Kingdom of the Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.
President of the United States of America at the Invitation of the Rt. Hon. Boris Johnson M.P. the Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, WHITE HOUSE (June 10, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/10/joint-statement-on-the-visit
-to-the-united-kingdom-of-the-honorable-joseph-r-biden-jr-president-of-the-united-states-of-america-atthe-invitation-of-the-rt-hon-boris-johnson-m-p-the-prime-min/ (stating that “we look forward to bringing
into force a robust bilateral data access agreement” referring to the U.S.-UK Agreement).
87. CLOUD Act Resources, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 20, 2021), https://www. justice. gov/ dag/
cloudact (listing the White Paper and, separately, the frequently asked questions also included as part of
the White Paper, as official documents).
88. See U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9.
89. Jennifer Daskal, Privacy and Security Across Borders, 128 YALE L.J. F. 1029, 1041 (2019);
see also, e.g., Ben Barnett, Caroline Black & Laura Manson, Overseas Production Orders – Where Are
We Now?, DECHERT LLP (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.dechert.com/knowledge/ onpoint/2020/11/
overseas-production-orders—-where-are-we-now-.html (“As yet, the U.S. has not passed domestic
legislation which would create reciprocal rights for U.S. authorities to obtain data from UK CSPs under
the Agreement.”); see Alison Geary & Joanna Howard, Apples and Oranges: UK-US Bilateral Data
Access Agreement Comes into Effect, WILMERHALE (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.wilmerhale.com/ en/
insights/blogs/wilmerhale-w-i-r-e-uk/20200811-apples-and-oranges-uk-us-bilateral-data-accessagreement-comes-into-effect (stating that, “despite [the] reciprocity” of the U.S.-UK Agreement, “[f]or
the US, there is no new process for seeking data overseas enacted into legislation”).
90. Daskal, Privacy and Security, supra note 89 at 1041 (“The CLOUD Act does not provide
any.”); see also Jennifer Daskal, Setting the Record Straight: the CLOUD Act and the Reach of
Wiretapping Authority Under US Law, CROSS-BORDER DATA F. (Oct. 1, 2018), https:// www. cross
borderdataforum.org/setting-the-record-straight-the-cloud-act-and-the-reach-of-wiretapping-authorityunder-us-law/ (“The executive agreements envisioned by the CLOUD Act do not provide any
independent authority to conduct wiretaps or other surveillance.”); Jennifer Daskal, Correcting the
Record: Wiretaps, the CLOUD Act, and the US-UK Agreement, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 31, 2019), https://
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points—evaluating, at U.S. law, the relevance of the White Paper and/or
whether additional legislative authority would be necessary to issue
extraterritorial requests—below.91 Before considering the impact of CLOUD
Act agreements at U.S. law, however, it is appropriate to first look at the
international plane.
III. JURISDICTIONAL BENEFITS OF CLOUD ACT AGREEMENTS
AT INTERNATIONAL LAW
Part III explains that direct access agreements like the U.S.-UK
Agreement provide their member states with at least two international law
benefits. International law can be subdivided into “private” and “public”
realms.92 Private international law, also known as “conflict of laws,”
“resolv[es] controversies between private persons . . . primarily in domestic
litigation, arising out of situations having a relationship to more than one
state.”93 Public international law, also known simply as “international law,”
regulates “the conduct of states and international organizations.”94 The U.S.UK Agreement appears to give jurisdictional benefits to its members in each
realm. Addressing these, Part III argues that U.S. law enforcement have good
reasons to take advantage of each benefit, focusing on stored data requests
under the SCA.95

www.justsecurity.org/66774/correcting-the-record-wiretaps-the-cloud-act-and-the-us-uk-agreement/
(arguing that, “while . . . the [U.S.-UK] Agreement provides for reciprocal access in theory, there is no
reciprocal change in practice” because “[t]here are no affirmative authorities . . . to enable the [U.S.] to
compel assistance by foreign-based providers that are not otherwise subject to U.S. jurisdiction”).
91. See infra Parts IV.C and IV.D.
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 101 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987); JAMES
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 458 (9th ed. 2019).
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 101; see also CRAWFORD, supra
note 92, at 458.
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 101; see CRAWFORD, supra note
92, at 3–11 (discussing the history of [t]he law of nations, now known as (public) international law”).
95. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703, 2713. This Part II assumes that the United
States can use the SCA to request data from foreign service providers, see supra note 7. But see also infra
Part IV.B. Although outside the scope of this article, the U.S.-UK Agreement also empowers the United
States (and UK) to directly enforce intercept or “wiretap” requests against foreign service providers. See
U.S.-UK AGREEMENT, supra note 2, art. 1(10)–(11) (defining “Legal Process” and “Order” to include
preservation and intercept requests). See generally Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–23 (comprising the
U.S. intercept statute). The Pen Register and Trap and Trace Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27, is also within
the scope of CLOUD Act executive agreements. See CLOUD Act § 104 (incorporated at 18 U.S.C. §§
3121(a), 3124(d)–(e)) (amending that legislation to effect this).
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A. Private International Law: Minimizing Conflicts
(1) How CLOUD Act Agreements Minimize Conflicts Of Laws
The primary claimed benefit of CLOUD Act agreements—minimizing
conflicts of law—is readily acknowledged by the United States. As it
explains:
[W]e live in a world of conflicting cross-currents – the simultaneous need
to reach out for data stored abroad and concern about limiting the ability
of others to reach in. And these contradictory pressures create a global
landscape rife with potential conflicts of law. The global technology
companies that hold electronic evidence are frequently subject to more
than one country’s laws. All too often, one country may order them to
disclose data needed for an investigation, while another country’s laws
may “block” disclosure of that same data. It is a constant push and pull.96

“The U.S. Congress enacted the CLOUD Act as a way [to] reduce [these]
conflicts of law,” the United States has remarked97—although the broad
extraterritorial scope of the CLOUD Act’s first accomplishment, new 18
U.S.C. § 2713, risks precisely the opposite, i.e. intensifying conflicts.98
While this is concerning,99 this article focuses on the CLOUD Act’s second
accomplishment, bilateral CLOUD Act agreements. In contrast to § 2713 of
the SCA, CLOUD Act agreements have the potential to reduce conflicts. In
particular, through these agreements, “[b]oth countries can agree to eliminate
the conflicts of law so that both countries can more efficiently obtain the
information needed to protect their citizens.”100 For example, the SCA,
which creates criminal offenses and civil remedies for wrongful disclosure
of communications processed by service providers,101 currently “stand[s] in
96. Downing, Germany speech, supra note 50; see DAVID ANDERSON, A QUESTION OF TRUST:
REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS REVIEW 204 (2015) (“[S]ervice providers operating
internationally . . . do not see it as their role to resolve the conflicts of jurisdiction that arise . . . But the
reality is that providers are at the centre of resolving those conflicts on a daily basis.”).
97. Downing, Germany speech, supra note 50; see also id. (referring to CLOUD Act agreements
“as a Respite from Conflicts”); Daskal, Privacy and Security, supra note 89, at 1036 n.25 (“[T]he whole
point of becoming a qualifying foreign government [under the CLOUD Act regime] is to minimize legal
conflict”).
98. I argue elsewhere that the new 18 U.S.C. § 2713 is an example of a “unilateral assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction” that risks exacerbating conflicts between jurisdictions. Cochrane, supra note
33, at 20 (quoting Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The Evolving
Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 473, 477–78 (2016)). Tellingly, this prospect
was emphasised before the Supreme Court in Microsoft Ireland prior to the passage of the CLOUD Act.
See, e.g., Brief for the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 13–14 , U.S. v Microsoft, 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (No 17-2) (noting, prior to the enactment of the
CLOUD Act that, applying the SCA “to date held in Ireland” or “in New Zealand” could “create a
conflict” and “risk a lack of clarity and so risk uncertainty and [further] conflict”).
99. Id.
100. Downing, Germany speech, supra note 50.
101. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (creating a criminal offense prohibiting
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the way of [U.S.] providers complying with lawful orders from” the United
Kingdom for the contents of communications.102 While the SCA permits, and
in certain scenarios compels, service providers regulated by U.S. law to
disclose communications to law enforcement and other governmental
entities, these exemptions do not apply to foreign governments.103 The SCA
instead acts as a blocking statute for U.S. service providers and foreign
governments, enacting a “presumptive ban on the disclosure of contents of
communications” from such providers overseas.104
The SCA’s blocking provisions will now fall away when UK law
enforcement request data through the U.S.-UK Agreement.105 UK law
enforcement may freely issue requests under their own law for such data to
U.S. service providers, and U.S. service providers need not worry that
responding may breach the SCA. The intention is that “[t]he only law
governing the disclosure would be the law of the country issuing the
order.”106 As a result, other than (under current law) merely theoretical
Fourth Amendment liability,107 providers will apparently be immunized
altogether under U.S. law for responding to such requests.108 Pursuant to new
certain “intentional[] access[]” to electronic communications held by providers subject to the SCA); id.
§ 2707 (allowing aggrieved persons to recover “such relief as may be appropriate,” including damages,
“in a civil action” from providers and others for “knowing or intentional” SCA violations); see Van
Alstyne v. Elec. Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199, 204–05 (4th Cir. 2009) (outlining the damages that
aggrieved persons may recover under 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c)); e.g., Cardinal Health 414, Inc. v. Adams, 582
F. Supp. 2d 967, 977 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (“[Defendant] plainly violated the SCA as a matter of law.”).
102. See Downing, Germany speech, supra note 50.
103. This article focuses on requests for content data, for which the SCA generally acts as a blocking
statute for foreign law enforcement. In contrast, where non-content data is requested, service providers
may conversely have greater freedom to disclose directly to foreign law enforcement than they do to U.S.
law enforcement. See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2702(a)(3), (c)(6), 2711(4); MULLIGAN,
supra note 58, at 4–5; see also Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162
PENN. L. REV. 373, 409 (2014).
104. See Kerr, supra note 103, at 409–10.
105. CLOUD Act, §§ 104(2)(A)(i)(II), 104(2)(B), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(9), 2707(e)(3).
106. Downing, Germany speech, supra note 50; see also Evan Norris & Morgan J. Cohen, How US
Authorities Obtain Foreign Evidence in Cross-Border Investigations, in AMERICAS INVESTIGATIONS
REVIEW 2021 25 (2020) (“Because the CLOUD Act removes [U.S.] legal prohibitions on disclosing
electronic information in response to [UK]-issued legal process, a [UK] reviewing court would not need
to engage in a conflict of laws analysis.”).
107. See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (suggesting it is
doubtful that SCA’s immunity provisions could exempt persons from Fourth Amendment liability). But
see Marshall v. Willner, No. CIV A 3:06CV-665-M, 2007 WL 2725971, 5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 14, 2007)
(reaching the opposite conclusion). However, good faith compliance on 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(9), see infra
notes 109–110, has been found to fulfill the Fourth Amendment. Thompson v. Platt, 815 F. App’x 227,
238–39 (10th Cir. 2020). In any event, Constitutional claims require “state action” but “a private party’s
mere compliance with a court order does not constitute state action.” Id. at 238. See also Patricia L. Bellia,
Chasing Bits Across Borders, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 35, 99 (“Under state action principles, foreign
conduct authorized by an international agreement will be attributable to the United States.”).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 115–117. Similar statutory immunities are provided when
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18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(9), providers will be exempt from civil liability when
responding to UK law enforcement data requests.109 A mere “good faith
reliance” on 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(9) provides “a complete defense to any
civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law.”110 On
their face, these provisions are expressly designed to protect providers.111 In
addition to CLOUD Act agreements directly reducing conflicts in this way,
an area for further study is whether the process of negotiating such
agreements may indirectly reduce conflicts and related concerns between
states. It is claimed, for example, that the United Kingdom enacted changes
to the IPA during U.S.-UK Agreement negotiations to pacify United States
objections to this legislation.112

U.S. service providers intercept or provide other data to foreign law enforcement pursuant to CLOUD
Act agreements. See ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 107 (4th ed. Supp. 2020) (noting that “the
CLOUD Act adds new exceptions to each of three major federal statutory surveillance laws for conduct
in response to foreign legal process” and describing these).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (“No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider . . . for
provider information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a . . . statutory
authorization . . . under this chapter.”); see Wilson v. Nextel Commc’n, 296 F. Supp. 3d 56, 59 (D.D.C.
2017) (holding providers become “not subject to suit” where 18 U.S.C. § 2703 applies); In re United
States, 157 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The provider . . . is shielded from liability for any
claim”); Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs., 875 F.3d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[18 U.S.C.] § 2703(e)
provides immunity to a service provider when it makes a disclosure in accordance with a provision of the
SCA.”). New 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(9) is a “statutory authorization.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8) (a
similarly worded statutory authorization); In re United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46–47 (D. Mass. 2005)
(holding 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8) was also a statutory authorization caught by 18 U.S.C. § 2703).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(e)(3); see Conley v. Turquand, No. A-07-CA-188-SS, 2008 WL 11404534,
at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2008) (recording counsel submission of this section as a “safe harbor”);
Hepting v. AT & T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing S. REP. NO. 99–541, at 26,
as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3580) (commenting that this requires only “a facially valid court
order”); e.g., Villa v. Maricopa City, 865 F.3d 1224, 1236–37 (9th Cir. 2017) (under equivalent Wiretap
Act laws, holding that “rights . . . were violated in two respects, but both violations were in good faith
within the meaning of” statutory provisions).
111. They may therefore incentivize providers not to investigate orders beyond determining these
are facially valid. See United States v. Rodriguez, No. 17-cr-10066-IT, 2018 WL 988054, at *4 (D. Mass.
Feb. 20, 2018) (“It is for the court, and not the service provider, to decide whether interception is
warranted.”); Sukkar v. USA Mobility, Inc., NO. MJG-06-848, 2006 WL 8456781, at *3 (D. Md. Sept.
20, 2006) (“Nor does the [SCA] require the provider of the information to engage in litigation regarding
the validity of an order with which it complies.”).
112. Raman, supra note 3 (“[T]he United Kingdom undertook changes to its own laws in order to
assure that it could comply with the CLOUD Act’s requirements.”). Linked to this, the CLOUD Act
requires that the U.S. Attorney-General must first provide “a written certification and explanation” to
Congress on the sufficiency of the laws of a proposed CLOUD Act agreement signatory state in certain
areas, including civil liberties, at least 180 days before the agreement comes into force. CLOUD Act §
105(a), 18 U.S.C. 2523(b)–(d) (2018); see, e.g., CLOUD Act; Attorney General Certification and
Determination, 85 Fed. Reg. 12578-01 (Mar. 3, 2020) (notification of the U.S.-U.K. Agreement
certification). The impact of what appear to be U.S. ‘adequacy’ mechanisms both here and in related areas
also deserves additional consideration.
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In any event, this direct “minimizing conflicts” benefit applies equally
to U.S. law enforcement, whether they are seeking data from service
providers solely operating in the United Kingdom,113 or from service
providers over which multiple states claim jurisdiction—including the
“global technology companies” like Google, Facebook, and Amazon that
operate in many jurisdictions.114 Putting aside potential personal jurisdiction
objections—considered separately at Part IV below—when served with an
SCA order from U.S. law enforcement, providers may currently theoretically
raise a “comity” (i.e. conflicts of law) defense,115 on the basis that to provide
the data would breach a foreign law like the United Kingdom IPA, which
creates criminal offenses and civil remedies similar to the SCA.116 However,
UK law blocking provisions will also drop away when U.S. law enforcement
requests are made pursuant to the U.S.-UK Agreement.117 The United
Kingdom has “designated” the U.S.-UK Agreement as a “relevant
international agreement” under section 52 of the IPA.118 Through this
designation, section 52 provides “the gateway for the flow of information
from the UK to the United States.”119 Service providers subject to UK law
may then process data for foreign law enforcement,120 so long as “the
interception is carried out in response to a request made in accordance with
a relevant international agreement by the competent authorities of a country

113. Whether U.S. law permits data requests to providers regulated solely by UK law, given personal
jurisdiction requirements in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause, is addressed in Part IV of this
article.
114. See Downing, Germany Speech supra note 50; see also supra note 96 and accompanying text.
115. See CLOUD Act § 103(c), Pub. L. No. 115–141, 132 Stat. 1213 (2018) (recognizing a common
law comity defense to SCA orders). See generally Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiele v. U.S.
Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544(1987) (setting out the common law test for raising a
conflict of laws objection under U.S. law).
116. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, § 3 (UK) (concerning criminal offenses); id. § 8
(concerning civil remedies); see HOME OFF., INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS: CODE OF PRACTICE
15–16 (2018) (UK) (summarizing these provisions); e.g., R v. Sargent [2001] UKHL 54, [2003] AC 347
[7], [26] (appeal taken from Eng.) (noting that “in carrying out the intercept,” party “had committed an
offence” of unlawful interception of a “public telecommunication system” under predecessor legislation).
117. See supra note 110.
118. UK Designation Regulations, supra note 72, reg. 2(b).
119. HL Deb (11 Feb. 2019) (795) col. 1671 (UK) (statement of Baroness Williams); UK
Designation Regulations, supra note 72, Explanatory Memorandum, ¶¶ 7.2, 7.4 (noting that, just as the
U.S.-UK Agreement “remove[s] the barriers in [U.S.] law to [U.S. service providers] acting upon UK
orders,” it “will also enable [U.S.] law enforcement to make requests directly to UK [service providers]
for data”).
120. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, §§ 4, 52 (UK); see id. Explanatory Notes ¶ 41
(“[I]nterception of a communication . . . includes accessing stored communications . . . such as messages
stored on phones, tablets, or other devices whether before or after they are sent.”); see also HL Deb (20
Nov. 2018) (794) cols. 140–41 (statement of Baroness Williams).
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or territory outside the United Kingdom.”121 This is again specifically
intended to immunize service providers from all UK law liability, whether
civil or criminal, when responding to requests under the U.S.-UK
Agreement.122 Through section 6 of the IPA, providers’ acts become lawful
under the IPA and “for all other purposes” under UK law.123 The House of
Lords (now replaced by the UK Supreme Court) has ruled that the
predecessor provision to section 6 must be given full force.124 As a result,
like the equivalent SCA position, providers relying on good faith that a
request appears to comply with the U.S.-UK Agreement, and therefore
section 52, appear immune from UK law liability,125 other than currently

121. Section 52 provides other threshold requirements, such as requiring that requests must target a
person believed to be outside the United Kingdom, Investigatory Powers Act § 52(4), but these are
redundant in this context, as they mirror requirements in the U.S.-UK Agreement itself. See, e.g., U.S.UK AGREEMENT, supra note 2, arts. 1(6), 1(12), 4(3)–(4) (prohibiting the United States from
“intentionally target[ing] persons in the United Kingdom). Although subsection (5) permits “further
conditions” to be specified in regulations, no such regulations currently exist.
122. HL Deb (19 Oct. 2016) (774) col. 2392 (UK) (statement of Earl Howe) (“[This provision] . . .
provid[es] reassurance for telecommunications operators that, when conduct is carried out in accordance
with the requirements of a notice, the operator will not risk being found to be in breach of any other legal
requirement.”); Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Explanatory Notes, ¶ 46 (similar); see Graham Smith,
The UK Investigatory Powers Act – What It Means for Your Business, 17 PRIV. & DATA PROT. 9, 10
(2016) (“A small ISP will benefit from the same broader lawful authority purposes as a large provider.”).
Providers may therefore again be incentivized not to look behind a facially valid order, see supra note
111, as appears to be their preference. ANDERSON, supra note 96, ¶ 11.32 (“UK companies were generally
united [in saying that they did] not wish to have a discretion to question the merits of a particular
interception or data request.”).
123. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, §§ 6 (1)(b), (2), (3)(b).
124. In re McE [2009] UKHL 15, [2009] AC 908 [61]–[62], [65] (holding that predecessor
legislation “must be taken to mean what it says”). The House of Lords’ reasoning is binding upon, and
has been followed by, subsequent UK courts. E.g., R v. Palmer [2014] EWCA (Crim) 1681 [31]–[36]
(Eng.); A.J.A. v. Comm’r of Police for the Metropolis [2013] EWCA (Civ) 1342 [31]–[32], [2014] WLR
285 (Eng.).
125. See Priv. Int’l v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aff. [2016] UKIPTrib 14_85CH [18](i), [20], overruled on other grounds by [2021] EWHC (Admin) 27, [2021] 2 WLR 970 (“No act
done pursuant to those sections can be unlawful either civilly or criminally.”); Harmes v. R. [2006]
EWCA (Crim) 928 [15] (noting an equivalent predecessor section “sanctions the legality of the conduct”)
(Eng.); SIMON MCKAY, COVERT POLICING ¶¶ 7.105, 7.107 (2d ed. 2015) (“Once a court is satisfied that
the [request] was properly [made] and the conduct did not exceed its terms, any attack on its lawfulness
ought to be impermissible.”); Simon McKay, Lawful Surveillance, COVERT POLICING L. BLOG (Jan. 16,
2016), https:// simonmckay.co.uk/lawful-surveillance/ (noting that it “creates a shield”); see also, e.g., R
(NTL Group Ltd.) v. Ipswich Crown Court [2002] EWHC (Admin) 1585 [24]–[25], [2003] QB 131 (Eng.)
(holding that “no offence will . . . be committed” where a service provider responded to an law
enforcement statutory request” that provided “lawful authority”).

COCHRANE MACROS(DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

HIDING IN THE EYE OF THE STORM CLOUD

4/10/2022 9:48 PM

175

theoretical liability under the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR)126 similar to the equivalent U.S. law position.127
(2) “Minimizing Conflicts” Is A Significant Benefit For U.S. Law
Enforcement—Although Potential GDPR Conflicts Raise Further Questions
U.S. law enforcement should be assumed to have the motivation to
channel SCA requests through the U.S.-UK Agreement to minimize
conflicts. Various service providers over which the United States asserts
jurisdiction, including global service providers, also operate in the United
Kingdom.128 These providers may reasonably fear that SCA requests will
breach UK law, such as the IPA’s blocking provisions—these are ambiguous
but may well be triggered for these providers by requests when data is stored
in, or otherwise connected to, the United Kingdom.129 The growth of
126. Under ECHR Article 8, protecting privacy and related areas, similar analysis applies as under
the Fourth Amendment. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
[ECHR], Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; see supra note 107. Sections 6 and 52 cannot directly immunise
conduct that otherwise breaches Article 8, e.g., RE v. United Kingdom, 63 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 ¶ 143 (2016)
(finding a breach of Article 8 notwithstanding a predecessor immunity provision), and good faith
compliance with the IPA would not necessarily fulfill Article 8’s requirements, e.g., id. at 121, 142, 143
(holding that, although the conduct “had a basis in domestic law,” the measures “did not meet the
requirements of Article 8 § 2”). However, Article 8’s obligations only directly limit interferences by
“public authorities,” and service providers are generally considered to fall outside its scope. E.g.,
Richardson v. Facebook [2015] EWHC (QB) 3154 [51]–[63]. But see Allison M. Holmes, Private Actors
or Public Authority? How the Status of Communications Service Providers Affects Human Rights, 22
COMMC’NS. L. 21 (2017) (suggesting providers should be treated as public authorities for this purpose).
127. See supra note 107.
128. See, e.g., Raj Bala et al., Magic Quadrant for Cloud Infrastructure and Platform Services,
GARTNER (Sept. 1, 2020), https:// www.gartner. com/en/documents/3989743/magic-quadrant-for-cloudinfr astructure-and-platform-ser (noting that major service providers operating in the United States,
including Amazon Web Services [AWS], Google, IBM, Microsoft, and Oracle, have data centers in the
United Kingdom). See generally ICO’s Priorities and Impact of our Work, INFO. COMM’R’S OFF. (July
31, 2021), https://ico.org.uk/ about- the-ico/news- and-events/ news-and-blogs/2021/07/ico-s-prioritiesand - impact-of-our-work (UK) (“Tech companies based across the world have a huge presence in the
UK, processing UK citizens [sic] data.”).
129. The IPA is “very complex,” R v. A [2021] EWCA (Crim) 128, [2021] 2 WLR 1301 [53], but
global service providers may breach its prohibition on unlawful interception by responding directly to
SCA requests in certain circumstances. First, the requested data must be communications content (or
related data) transmitted via a “public telecommunications system,” meaning equipment in or controlled
from the United Kingdom, used to provide services to people there. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c.
25, § 3(1)(a)(i) (UK); see id. § 261(8)–(13) (defining public “telecommunications system” and related
terms); LAW COMMISSION, supra note 59, ¶ 16.84 (“The IPA covers any telecommunications operator
which provides services to persons within the UK, thereby establishing a necessary jurisdictional
connection.”); INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 116, ¶¶ 2.4–2.8 (summarising these).
Global service providers provide services to United Kingdom persons using equipment located in the
United Kingdom over which communications and related data may be transmitted. See supra note 128.
Secondly, the SCA request must require a “relevant act” to be “carried out by conduct in the United
Kingdom,” including “modifying, or interfering with, the system or its operation” or “monitoring
transmissions made by means of the system.” Investigatory Powers Act 2016 §§ 4(2), (8)(a). The meaning
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blocking statutes generally have led to predictions of “greater difficulties for
U.S. parties who seek access to data in non-U.S. clouds.”130 To the extent
these difficulties are caused by UK laws, the U.S.-UK Agreement provides
a tailor-made and simple solution: to avoid such conflicts when serving an
SCA order on a service provider, all that is required is an additional
“certification” from DOJ stating that the order is being issued under, and
complies with, the U.S.-UK Agreement and applicable U.S. law.131 The ease
at which this may occur, and the benefits U.S. law enforcement gain from
doing so where there is otherwise a risk of UK law conflicts, suggests they
will do so as a matter of course.132
What is perhaps the most significant blocking statute, the EU General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR or EU GDPR), bears mention. Although
the United Kingdom has left the European Union following Brexit, the
GDPR has been incorporated within domestic UK law as the “UK GDPR,”133
and is an example of “retained EU law.”134 Both the EU and UK GDPR
comprise “a broad set of privacy regulations governing the collection and
use of data.”135 The EU Court of Justice (CJEU), which definitively

of “relevant act” is unclear, R v. A [2021] EWCA (Crim) 128 [32], [52]–[53], but the mere extraction of
data from a UK server may contribute to or fulfil this requirement. See id. (noting that this was considered
relevant by the first instance court but not determining “whether the judge was right”). In any event, some
providers require local (or regional) access to data stored on such infrastructure, which may be further
“conduct in the United Kingdom.” See Schwartz, supra note 84, at 1697 (“[C]loud services offered by
AWS and Microsoft’s regional European Union cloud are not accessible from the United States.”).
130. Schwartz, supra note 84, at 1740–41 (noting predictions of “greater difficulties for U.S. parties
who seek access to data in non-U.S. Clouds,” due to “conflicting rules” internationally); see also infra
note 155 (discussing predictions of conflicts with the EU GDPR in particular).
131. U.S.-UK AGREEMENT, supra note 2, arts. 1(8), 1(11), 5(5), 5(7); see Designated Authority
under Executive Agreements on Access to Data by Foreign Governments, 28 C.F.R. § 0.64–6 (2020)
(authorizing certain DOJ officials to act as “designated authority” under the U.S.-UK Agreement).
132. See also infra notes 224–226 and accompanying text (noting that the United States is currently
actively devoting resources to issuing requests under CLOUD Act agreements, further suggesting that it
will make regular use of these agreements).
133. Data Protection Act 2018, c. 12 (UK); Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications
(Amendments etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, SI 2020/1586, regs. 2–3 (incorporating the GDPR at UK
law as the “UK GDPR.”); see Rondón v. LexisNexis Risk Solutions UK Ltd. [2021] EWHC (QB) 1427
[14], appeal pending, A2/2021/1093 (Jan. 25 or 26, 2022). See generally ROSEMARY JAY, DATA
PROTECTION: LAW AND PRACTICE ¶¶ 1–074 to 1–084 (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. 2020) (summarizing
these arrangements).
134. European Union (Withdrawal) Act (EUWA) 2018, c. 16, §§ 6, 7 (UK); see Lipton v. BA City
Flyer Ltd. [2021] EWCA (Civ) 454 [52]–[83], [2021] 1 WLR 2545 (elaborating on the interpretation of
EUWA and providing “basic principles” for interpreting EU law within UK courts after Brexit); see also
Sara Drake & Jo Hunt, Clarifying the Duties of the UK Judiciary Post-Brexit: Lipton and Anr v BA City
Flyer Ltd, MOD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 6–11) (elaborating).
135. See In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. Litig., 477 F. Supp. 3d 980, 993 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2020); see also In
re Nielsen Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 510 F. Supp. 3d 217, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
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interprets the GDPR’s terms,136 has confirmed that the GDPR applies to data
processing by service providers in response to law enforcement or similar
requests.137 U.S. courts are already considering arguments that the GDPR
acts as a blocking statute in civil discovery and in response to administrative
subpoenas, with varying degrees of success.138 Daskal has suggested that the
GDPR may “yield[] new claims of conflict” by providers in response to SCA
requests.139 As Jessica Shurson explains, “experts tend to agree that [the]
GDPR will almost always act as a blocking provision for routine SCA
warrants.”140 U.S. law enforcement have repeatedly expressed concerns
about the GDPR, fearing that it will ultimately diminish their access to data

136. But see EUWA, § 6(1) (UK) (“A [UK] court . . . is not bound by any principles laid down, or
any decisions made, on or after [Brexit], by the European Court [of Justice] . . . .”); see also id. §§ 6(4)–
(5B) (further exempting the UK Supreme Court and the Scottish High Court of Justiciary from being
bound by “retained EU case law” in certain circumstances and allowing further exemptions to be
regulated); The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Relevant Court) (Retained EU Case Law)
Regulations 2020, 2020/1525 (additionally exempting the Court of Appeal in England and Wales and
certain higher courts); see Target Group Ltd v. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2021] EWCA (Civ)
1043 [2021] STC 1662 [97] (suggesting that these only provide “power [to] the court[s] to depart from
retained EU case law in . . . narrow circumstances”).
137. See Case C-623/17, Priv. Int’l v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affs., 2020
E.C.R. 790. A separate EU instrument regulates data processing for law enforcement purposes by police
and other “competent authorities.” Directive 2016/680, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by
Competent Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of
Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (Law Enforcement Directive), 2016 O.J. (L 119)
89 [hereinafter LED]. Priv. Int’l confirms that where law enforcement request data from service
providers, the GDPR will govern providers’ data processing, rather than other instruments, such as the
LED. Priv. Int’l, 2020 E.C.R. ¶47; see R (MR) v. Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2021] EWCA (Civ)
42 [35], [81] (confirming that data processing for law enforcement purposes by non-competent
authorities, like service providers, is subject to the GDPR, not LED). As CLOUD Act agreements deal
with data transfers from service providers to law enforcement, the GDPR rather than the LED is therefore
the appropriate instrument to focus on.
138. Compare, e.g., In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 484 F. Supp. 3d 249,
266–68 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (rejecting claim, holding “American law must take precedence”), with In re
Hansainvest Hanseatische Inv.-GmbH, 364 F. Supp. 3d 243, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (granting application
to compel disclosure from foreign custodians but requiring applicant to assume costs, “including the costs
of compliance with the GDPR” and to “indemnify [foreign custodians] against any potential breaches of
European data privacy laws”). See United States v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., No. 3:20-CV00158, 2020 WL 3956647, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. July 6, 2020) (recording counsel argument that the GDPR
justified a party’s resistance to a DOJ administrative subpoena).
139. Jennifer Daskal, Microsoft Ireland, the CLOUD Act, and International Lawmaking 2.0, 71
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 12–13 (2018); e.g., Brief for Respondent at 17, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S.
Ct. 118 (2018) (no. 17-2) (predicting that the GDPR would contribute to “international discord” for law
enforcement seeking overseas data). See generally SOJ v. JAO [2019] EWHC (QB) 2569 [37.2] (“[T]he
territorial reach of the GDPR is not in any event a matter of [U.S.] law.”).
140. Jessica Shurson, Data Protection and Law Enforcement Access to Digital Evidence: Resolving
the Reciprocal Conflicts Between EU and US Law, 28 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 167, 177 (2020).
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for law enforcement investigations.141 This risk appears credible. Providers,
including global providers based in the United States, may well increasingly
attempt to raise a comity defense in the face of SCA requests based on the
GDPR.142 Even if such defenses are rejected by U.S. courts, providers may
ultimately prefer to face a contempt of court finding there than risk receiving
an extensive fine for breaching the GDPR from one of its “supervisory
authorities.”143
The interplay between the GDPR and CLOUD Act agreements raises
various challenging questions worthy of further investigation; indeed,
ambiguity over how data protection law interacts with the U.S.-UK
Agreement appears to be a driving force behind the continued delay by its
parties to bring it into force.144 First, is the United Kingdom’s designation of
the U.S.-UK Agreement actually able to remove UK law blocking statutes,
including the UK GDPR? Achieving this is the United Kingdom’s primary
obligation under the U.S.-UK Agreement.145 However, a recent judgment
suggests that the United Kingdom’s method of doing so—the section 52
141. E.g., Downing, Germany speech, supra note 50 (“From our perspective, it seems that data
protection laws are increasingly put forth as reasons for blocking the provision of essential information
to third-party government law enforcement and regulatory agencies charged with assuring public safety
and well-being.”); see Matt Miner, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the
American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Third Global White Collar Crime Institute
Conference (June 27, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-mattmin er-delivers-remarks-american-bar-association (remarking that “data privacy and other restrictions,”
including GDPR, “are an evolving area,” “[f]urther complicating” law enforcement “access to electronic
evidence”); Raman, supra note 3 (making similar remarks); David J. Redl, Assistant Sec’y of Com. for
Commc’n and Info., Remarks at National Secretary Telecommunications Advisory Committee Meeting
(May 17, 2018), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/ speech testimony/ 2018/remarks-assistant-secretary-redlnational-security-telecommunications-advisory (cautioning that these “create[] serious and unclear legal
obligations” and risk a “widespread impact” on law enforcement and others); see also Downing, ELC
speech, supra note 34.
142. See supra notes 139–140.
143. See GDPR, supra note 13, art. 83(5) (providing authority for supervisory authorities to impose
administrative fines for GDPR infringements for improperly transferring data internationally reaching
“up to 4 % of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year . . . .”); e.g., Vincent
Manancourt, With Amazon Fine, Luxembourg Emerges as Europe’s Unlikely Privacy Champion,
POLITICO (July 30, 2021, 6:57 PM), https://www. politico. eu/ article/amazon-fine-luxembourg-europeprivacy-champion/ (“Amazon said [Luxembourg] had fined it a record €746 million after finding that the
way the e-commerce giant handles people’s personal information falls afoul of Europe’s strict privacy
code.”). See generally GDPR, supra note 13, ch. VI (setting out the powers and functions of supervisory
authorities).
144. See Commission Implementing Decision 2021/1773, 2021 O.J. (L 360) ¶¶ 153–56 (EU)
(recording EU views of the U.S.-UK Agreement, as well as the United Kingdom’s confirmation “that
they will only let the [U.S.-UK] Agreement enter into force once they [have] . . . clarity with respect to
compliance with the data protection standards for any data requested under [it].”).
145. U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 4; UK EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 27, ¶¶
7–8; Data Access Agreement Press Release, supra note 3; HL Deb (20 Nov. 2018) (794) cols. 139–40
(UK) (statement of Baroness Williams).
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designation—may currently be ineffective. In Open Rights Group, the Court
of Appeal of England and Wales stated that the “principle of supremacy of
EU law” continues to apply to the “UK GDPR.”146 “If and to the extent that
a domestic provision cannot be read in such a way as to comply with the [UK
GDPR], it should be disapplied,” the court held.147 While this judgment has
been criticized,148 it may mean that the UK GDPR continues to have effect
despite the section 52 designation purporting to make providers’ conduct
“lawful for all purposes.” This invites a further question: assuming its current
approach is ineffective, what can the United Kingdom do? At the time of
writing, its proposed solution appears to be to repeal and replace the UK
GDPR with a stand-alone UK data protection regime.149 Whether the section
52 designation would override a new regime appears likely,150 but is also not
free from doubt.151
Taking into account EU law invites further questions. Even if the
section 52 designation excused providers from complying with any
146. R (Open Rights Group) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2021] EWCA (Civ) 800 [11]–
[13]; see R (Open Rights Group) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t) [2021] EWCA (Civ) 1573 [14];
see also Lipton v. BA City Flyer Ltd. [2021] EWCA (Civ) 454 [2021] 1 WLR 2545 [83] (providing
“basic principles” for interpreting EU law within UK courts after Brexit). See generally European Union
(Withdrawal) Act, 2018, c. 16, § 5(2) (UK) (“[T]he principle of supremacy of EU law continues to apply
on or after [exit day] so far as relevant to the interpretation, disapplication or quashing of any enactment
or rule of law passed or made before [exit day].”).
147. Open Rights Group [2021] EWCA (Civ) 800 [11]. See generally R v. Sec’y of State for
Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. [1991] AC 603 (HL) 658–59 (appeal taken from Eng.) (noting that,
under then applicable EU law, “it has always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court,
when delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any
directly enforceable rule of [EU] law”).
148. E.g., Nicholas Kilford, The Supremacy of Retained EU Law: ‘We’re Lost, But We’re Making
Good Time!’, UK CONST. L. BLOG (July 27, 2021), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/ 2021/07/27/nicholaskilford-the- supremacy-of-retained-eu- law-were- lost- but- were- making- good- time/ (outlining “the
ambiguity in the supremacy principle” and discussing “three problems” with Open Rights Group
specifically).
149. Harry Yorke, Oliver Dowden: Creating Our Own Data Laws Is One of Brexit’s Best Prizes;
Reformed Regulations Will Boost Our Digital Economy and Cut Pointless Red Tape, TELEGRAPH (Aug.
25, 2021, 9:55 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2021/08/25/oliver-dowden-creating-data-lawsone -b iggest-prizes-brexit/; see Press Release, UK Dep’t for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, UK Unveils
Post-Brexit Global Data Plans to Boost Growth, Increase Trade and Improve Healthcare (Aug. 25, 2021),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-unveils-post-brexit-global-data-plans-to-boost-growth-increa
se - trade-and-improve-healthcare (“Now that we have left the EU I’m determined to seize the opportunity
by developing a world-leading data policy . . . It means reforming our own data laws so that they’re based
on common sense, not box-ticking.”).
150. See European Union (Withdrawal) Act (EUWA) 2018, c. 16, § 5(1) (UK) (“The principle of
the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law passed or made on or after [exit
day].”).
151. See JAY, supra note 133, § 3–038 (“[Ca]ses may still be decided in accord with retained EU
law even if the law has subsequently been modified by UK law if in doing so [this] is consistent with the
intention of the modification.”) (citing EUWA, c. 16, § (6)(3)).
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otherwise conflicting UK law obligations, could it excuse providers from
obligations at EU law? As a directly applicable EU regulation, the EU GDPR
applies across all EU member states, as well as the European Economic Area
(EEA).152 Many service providers operating in both the United States and
United Kingdom also operate within the EU and EEA,153 including in
circumstances subjecting them to the requirements of EU law, such as the
GDPR.154 Given the EU law principle of supremacy, it appears that providers
may remain subject to EU law conflicts regardless of the changes to data
protection that are made at UK law. Again, if this is the case, what should be
done? This question is of pressing importance. To meaningfully resolve
conflicts between U.S. and EU law, an agreement between the United States
and EU appears necessary.155 Negotiating such an agreement to ensure its
contents satisfy all relevant parties, including ultimately the CJEU, is, to say
the least, difficult.156 Indeed, related privacy and data protection concerns
regarding the scope of the EU’s own proposed “e-Evidence” direct access
mechanism continue to stymie its progression.157 Ultimately, resolution of
these various UK and EU law questions appears necessary for the United
States (or, indeed, the United Kingdom) to fully realize this private
international law benefit of the U.S.-UK Agreement.

152. See generally GDPR, supra note 13, art. 3 (setting out its territorial scope). The application of
the GDPR is not an “all or nothing” question; instead, providers must “assess[] whether particular
processing. . . . falls within the scope of the [GDPR].” See EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD,
GUIDELINES 3/2018 ON THE TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE GDPR (ARTICLE 3) 4–5 (2019); e.g., Case C507/17, Google v. Comm’r nationale de I’linformatique et des libertes, ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, ¶¶ 61–73
(Sept. 24, 2019) (holding that Google’s obligations to “de-reference” data under the GDPR were
territorially limited to “the Member States”).
153. See, e.g., Bala et al., supra note 128, at 6 (“AWS . . . has . . . regions in . . . France,
Germany, . . . Sweden and [elsewhere].”).
154. See, e.g., Marco Stefan & Gloria González Fuster, Cross-Border Access to Electronic Data
Through Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters: State of the Art and Latest Development in the EU
and US, CTR. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD. (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.ceps.eu/ ceps- publications/ crossborder- access-electronic-data-through-judicial-cooperation-criminal-matters/ (discussing GDPR and its
applicability to providers).
155. Thomas Streinz, The Evolution of European Data Law, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 902,
932 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 2021); see Shurson, supra note 140, at 181–82 (recognizing
that service providers would be adversely impacted if the CLOUD Act were not reconciled with EU law);
Abraha, supra note 51, at 149 (similar); see also Joint US-EU Statement on Electronic Evidence Sharing
Negotiations, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/ opa/ pr/joint -us- eustatement- electronic-evidence-sharing-negotiations. See generally supra note 31 (detailing the ongoing
EU-US negotiations arising from GDPR and related measures).
156. See Christakis & Terpan, supra note 31, at 104 (referring to these and related negotiations as
“highly complex and challenging”); Downing, ELC speech, supra note 34 (discussing difficulties with
U.S.-EU negotiations arising from GDPR and related measures).
157. See, e.g., Stefan & Fuster, supra note 154, at 46–49 (outlining GDPR and related concerns with
the proposed EU “e-Evidence” direct access mechanism)..
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B. Public International Law: Extending Enforcement Jurisdiction
(1) How CLOUD Act Agreements Allow States To Expand Jurisdiction
A second significant benefit of CLOUD Act agreements is that they
allow their members to expand jurisdiction internationally by lifting what is
known as the prohibition against extraterritorial “enforcement jurisdiction”
at international law. Enforcement jurisdiction “concerns the authority of a
state to exercise its power to compel compliance with law.”158 U.S. and UK
courts continue to recognize the continued force of this prohibition,159
although there are growing debates as to whether and how it should apply to
cross-border data flows.160 It would traditionally prohibit U.S. or UK law
enforcement from seeking to compel a foreign service provider not operating
in their territory to disclose data under international law, as two seminal
cases—one U.S. and one UK—from the 1980s bear out. In 1980, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an attempt by the Federal Trade
Commission “to serve its investigatory subpoenas directly upon citizens of
other countries by registered mail,” holding that “the act of service itself
constitutes an act of American sovereign power within the area of the foreign

158. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. ch. 3, introductory note (AM. L.
INST. 2018); see R (Jimenez) v. First Tier Tribunal [2019] EWCA (Civ) 51, [2019] 1 WLR 2956 [45]
(Eng.) (“A state’s enforcement jurisdiction includes its power to carry out its official functions if
necessary by coercive means.”); BOISTER, supra note 44, at 311 (“Activities requiring legal authority
such as the gathering of admissible evidence. . . . are exercises in enforcement jurisdiction.”);
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 432 cmt. A. (“A state typically exercises
jurisdiction to enforce through its law-enforcement officers, often at the direction of its courts.”). It is not
engaged by law enforcement acts not backed by the possibility of sanction. E.g., Jimenez [2019] EWCA
(Civ) 51 [51]–[57]; see R (KBR, Inc.) v. Dir. of the Serious Fraud Off. [2021] UKSC 2, [2021] 2 WLR
335 [58]–[59] (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK). See generally Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 494 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The distinction between service of compulsory process
and service of notice is critical under principles of international law due to the difference in judicial
enforcement power that accompanies each.”).
159. E.g., Usoyan v. Rep. of Turkey, 6 F.4th 31, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“Turkey is a foreign power
and—as Turkey itself concedes—its agents do not have the authority to perform law enforcement
functions inside the United States.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE
U.S. § 432 cmt. B. (“[A] state may not exercise jurisdiction to enforce in the territory of another state.”));
Perry v. Serious Organised Crime Agency [2012] UKSC 35, [2013] 1 AC 182 [94] (appeal taken from
Eng.) (UK) (noting that exercising coercive jurisdiction extraterritorially “would be a particularly
startling breach of international law”). But see also KBR, Inc. [2021] UKSC 2 [50]–[51] (following Perry
but suggesting that “it may well be correct that not every case in which legislation confers powers to
impose obligations on foreign persons abroad under pain of criminal sanction would necessarily
constitute a breach of international law . . . .”).
160. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 59, ¶ 16.87 (“Strict adherence to the Lotus-based principle
of enforcement jurisdiction is neither possible nor desirable when electronic data is sought.”); see also
CRAWFORD, supra note 92, at 462–64 (outlining the “present position” regarding enforcement
jurisdiction); BOISTER, supra note 44, at 329–31 (discussing state attempts to unilaterally gather evidence
extraterritorially, noting “the international legality of which may be dubious”).
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country’s territorial sovereignty.”161 Enforcing such subpoenas “would
clearly extend American enforcement jurisdiction beyond the limits of its
prescriptive jurisdiction” under its empowering statute, and “violate[] a
fundamental principle of international law.”162 Five years later, Hoffmann,
J., (as he then was) in the Chancery Division of the High Court of England
and Wales rejected a similar attempt to serve a subpoena on an American
bank not party to the underlying proceedings.163 He noted that subpoenas,
requiring the production of documents backed by the threat of sanction, are
“an exercise of sovereign authority”; as such, unilaterally requiring
compliance by a foreign (United States) nonparty with a subpoena would be
“an infringement of the sovereignty of the United States.”164 The U.S.-UK
Agreement will, however, allow these authorities to be distinguished,
expanding the ability of its members to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction
over foreign service providers at international law.
This public international law benefit of direct access mechanisms flows
from the nature of “jurisdiction” at international law. As in domestic law,165
the term “jurisdiction” in international law is contextual and often
confusing.166 International law jurisdiction can be divided into several
161. F.T.C. v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
162. Id. at 1318; see also id. at 1316 (“When an American court orders enforcement of a subpoena
requiring the production of documents and threatens noncompliance with that subpoena, it invokes the
enforcement jurisdiction. . . .of the United States.”); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF
THE U.S. § 432 reporters’ notes 1 (referring to “executing an order for the production of documents” as
an act “constituting jurisdiction to enforce”); e.g., In re Search of Info. Associated with
[redacted]@gmail.com, No. 16-MJ-00757, 2017 WL 3445634, at *14 (D.D.C. July 31, 2017) (“The SCA
warrant was merely an exercise of this Court’s enforcement jurisdiction”).
163. Mackinnon v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp. [1986] Ch 482, 493–95 (Eng.); see SAS
Inst. Inc. v. World Programming Ltd. [2020] EWCA (Civ) 599 [68]–[70], leave to appeal granted, UKSC
2020/0118 (2021) (suggesting Mackinnon describes enforcement jurisdiction). See generally CRAWFORD,
supra note 92, at 462 (“[O]rders for the production of documents may not be executed on the territory of
another state, except under the terms of a treaty or other consent given.”). Hoffman, J., would later serve
as a Law Lord in the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, now the UK Supreme Court.
164. Mackinnon [1986] EWHC (Ch) 482 at 494.
165. See Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Comm. [1968] 2 QB 862, 889 (Diplock LJ) (Eng.)
(“‘Jurisdiction’ is an expression which is used in a variety of senses and takes its colour from its
context.”); United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 39 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he term ‘jurisdiction’. . . is a verbal coat of too many colors.”); see, e.g., R (Priv. Int’l)
v. Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22 (appeal taken from Eng.) (debating different
interpretations of “jurisdiction” in a particular statute); see also United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475,
479–80 (1984). While “[d]omestic and international law on jurisdiction influence each other,” they “are
distinct bodies of law.” RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 401 cmt. A;
e.g. R (KBR, Inc.) v. Dir. of the Serious Fraud Off. [2021] UKSC 2, [2021] 2 WLR 33 [24]–[25] (appeal
taken from Eng.) (UK) (noting uncertainty as to the “precisely defined rules in international law”
regarding jurisdiction and therefore limiting an asserted extraterritorial act based on comity).
166. See R (Smith) v. Oxfordshire Assistance Deputy Coroner [2010] UKSC 29, [2011] 1 AC 1
[237] (Lord Collins) (Eng.) (“The expression ‘jurisdiction’ is used in many senses in international law.”);
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categories, including jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e. “to make law applicable
to persons, property or conduct,” and jurisdiction to enforce, i.e. “to
exercise . . . power to compel compliance with law.”167 International law is
often permissive concerning extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction.168 In
contrast, “[e]nforcement jurisdiction is strictly territorially bounded.”169
However, the prohibition against extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction
applies only to unilateral acts; where the foreign state of the territory
concerned consents, no jurisdictional issue arises in respect of that foreign
state under international law.170 Foreign state consent may be provided
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 401 (“The foreign relations law of the
United States divides jurisdiction into three categories”); e.g., R (Jimenez) v. First Tier Tribunal (Tax
Chamber) [2019] EWCA (Civ) 51, [2019] 1 WLR 2956 [53] (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK) (“Delineating
the precise boundary between prescriptive (or legislative) and enforcement jurisdiction in international
law is far from straightforward.”); see F.T.C. v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d
at 1318 (“Questions of service of process, subject matter jurisdiction, and personal jurisdiction are
invariably intertwined and, hence, frequently confused.”).
167. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 401; see CRAWFORD, supra
note 92, at 440; Smith, [2010] UKSC 29 [241]–[43] (Lord Mance); F.T.C. v. Compagnie De SaintGobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d at 1315–17. The Restatement also includes jurisdiction to adjudicate,
i.e. “to apply law to persons or things,” as a third intermediary category. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF
THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 401. The late Judge Crawford considered this an instance of
enforcement jurisdiction, although conceded that at least aspects “may be better seen as a manifestation
of prescriptive jurisdiction.” CRAWFORD, supra note 92, at 440 n.3; see Alex Mills, Rethinking
Jurisdiction in International Law, 84 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 187, 194–95 (2014) (summarising differing
views). It is unnecessary to resolve this uncertainty in this article, as its focus is on enforcement
jurisdiction.
168. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. §§ 401 cmt. B., 407 cmt.
C., 422 n.1; Mills, supra note 167, at 195 (“The territorial character of enforcement jurisdiction is well
established”); Robert J. Currie, Cross-Border Evidence Gathering in Transnational Criminal
Investigation: Is the Microsoft Ireland Case the Next Frontier?, 53 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 63, 70 (2016)
(“Extraterritorial law-making by states tends to be considered lawful [but]. . . [t]his generally permissive
approach is in stark contrast to the rules surrounding the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction.”) (emphasis
added); c.f., CRAWFORD, supra note 92, at 462 (“By contrast[with prescriptive jurisdiction], the unilateral
and extraterritorial use of enforcement jurisdiction is impermissible.”).
169. Currie, supra note 168, at 70; see S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
10, at 18–19 (Sept. 7) (“[F]ailing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – [a state] may not
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly
territorial . . . .”); see Corfu Channel (UK v. Al.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 34–35 (Apr. 9) (rejecting
the argument that the United Kingdom was entitled to unilaterally “secure possession of evidence in the
territory of another State, in order to submit it to an international tribunal”); Michael Akehurst,
Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT. L. 145, 146–48 (1972–1973) (“An act by one State
in the territory of another State . . . for the purpose of enforcing the first State’s . . . laws, is contrary to
international law. . . [T]he act is a usurpation of the sovereign powers of the local State.”).
170. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 401 cmt. B (“The United
States . . . generally exercises enforcement jurisdiction in the territory of another state only with the
consent of the other state.”); CRAWFORD, supra note 92, at 462 (referring to “treaty or other consent” as
displacing this prohibition); see CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 424 (2016) (“States
may indeed by agreement between themselves abrogate the rule against the enforcement of foreign public
law altogether.”). See generally Compania Naviera Vascongado v. Steamship “Cristina” and Persons
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through an international treaty—like the U.S.-UK Agreement171—or
informally.172 Through the U.S.-UK Agreement, the United States and
United Kingdom have provided sufficient consent at international law to
permit law enforcement from the other state to expand enforcement
jurisdiction over service providers operating in their jurisdiction, through the
lifting of “blocking statutes” that otherwise purport to make this unlawful
under U.S. or UK law.173 This is a potentially significant, arguably
“sovereignty-enhancing,” benefit.174 However, an act may be lawful at
international law, but unlawful under domestic law.175 It is therefore
necessary to turn to the law of each state to determine whether this benefit is
realizable in practice.
The United Kingdom appears well-placed to reap this benefit—indeed,
it expressly asserts the ability to do so, saying that the U.S.-UK Agreement
will enable its law enforcement to compel data from providers previously
“beyond the reach of existing domestic court orders” that could only be
reached through MLA.176 New UK legislation enacted specifically for the
U.S.-UK Agreement, the Crime Overseas Production Orders Act 2019
(COPOA), permits court orders compelling stored data from foreign service
Claiming and Interest Therein [1938] AC (HL) 485, 496–97 (appeal taken from Eng.) (referring to
territorial sovereignty as an “essential attribute” of “all sovereign independent States” but noting that
States “have been led by courtesy as well as by self-interest to waive in favour of each other certain of
their sovereign rights,” including territorial sovereignty); Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136
(1812) (“All exceptions. . .to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be
traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.”).
171. See Theodore Christakis & Kenneth Propp, The Legal Nature of the UK-US CLOUD
Agreement, CROSS-BORDER DATA F. (Apr. 20, 2020), https:// www.crossborderdataforum.org/ the-legalnature- of- the -u k- us- cloud- agreement/ (concluding that CLOUD Act agreements are “binding
international agreement[s]” under international law).
172. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 442 reporters’ notes 3;
CRAWFORD, supra note 92, at 462; see Bellia, supra note 107, at 80 (“[A] a state can simply give the
searching state permission to examine data located within its territory.”); e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 15 (1957) (referring to U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction pursuant to a treaty); Casdagli v. Casdagli
[1919] AC (HL) 145, 156 (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK) (“The jurisdiction exercised by His Majesty in
Egypt is indeed extra-territorial, but it is exercised with the consent of the Egyptian Government . . . .”).
173. See supra notes 56–57.
174. Compare Hannah L Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VIRG. J. INT’L L 252,
308 (2006) (arguing in the regulatory context that “if one theorizes sovereignty as status within the
international community” then “bilateral cooperation instruments” can be described as “sovereigntyenhancing”), with NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION AND MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE SEARCH
AND SURVEILLANCE ACT 2012: ISSUES PAPER NZLC IP40, ¶ 6.127 (Nov. 2016) “(A [CLOUD Act]
agreement would . . . involve sacrificing a degree of sovereignty”).
175. See generally F.T.C. v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[S]ome exercises of jurisdiction to which international law does not object may violate
the Constitution or laws of the United States.”).
176. Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Act (COPOA) 2019, c. 5, Explanatory Notes ¶¶ 1–4 (UK);
see id. §§ 1(2), 1(4)–(5), 4(2) (providing for these powers).
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providers operating in the United States, under threat of contempt of court,177
even where these providers have no UK presence whatsoever.178 Daskal
describes this legislation as “a broad assertion of authority” but one
“premised on consent,” as requests must be channeled through the U.S.-UK
Agreement (or any future similar arrangements with other foreign states).179
Domestic UK law does not appear to meaningfully constrain the United
Kingdom from making ample use of the U.S.-UK Agreement in this way. At
UK law, two aspects of jurisdiction will normally be required in this context:
“personal jurisdiction, i.e. who can be brought before the court, [and] subject
matter jurisdiction, i.e. to what extent the court can claim to regulate the
conduct of those persons.”180
In the United Kingdom, personal jurisdiction is satisfied through
service of process.181 COPOA’s service requirements “have been drafted to
allow for flexibility,”182 permitting overseas service in a wide range of
scenarios, including electronically.183 This requirement is therefore readily
177. Criminal Procedure Rules 2020, SI 2020/759, r. 47.68 (UK).
178. COPOA 2019, c. 5, §§ 4(2), (8)(a) (permitting orders against persons operating or based in a
territory outside the United Kingdom where that territorial sovereign is party to a “designated
international co-operation agreement” with the United Kingdom, “whether or not the person also creates,
processes, communicates or stores data by electronic means in the United Kingdom”); see Ryan Junck et
al., What Recent US and UK Reforms to Information Sharing Mean for Cross-Border Investigations,
GLOB. INVESTIGATIONS REV. (July 18, 2019), https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/what-recent-usand- uk-reforms-information-sharing-mean-cross-border-investigations (“The Crime (Overseas
Production Orders) Act. . . empower[s] enforcement agencies to compel disclosure from any individual
or company operating or based abroad, provided that the UK has a designated international cooperation
agreement . . . with the country where the production order will be served.”) (emphasis added).
179. Jennifer Daskal, Transnational Government Hacking, 10 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 677, 695
(2020); see COPOA 2019, c. 5, § 4(2) (requiring, among other criteria, that a court be satisfied that “there
are reasonable grounds for believing that” the overseas service provider “against whom the order is
sought” is “based in” or otherwise “operates in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom which
is a party to, or participates in, the designated international co-operation arrangement.”).
180. Société Eram Shipping Co. v. Cie Internationale de Navigation [2003] UKHL 30, [2004] 1 AC
260 [22]–[23] (quoting Mackinnon v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp. [1986] Ch 482, 493
(Eng.)); SAS Inst. Inc. v. World Programming Ltd. [2020] EWCA (Civ) 599 [68]–[71], leave to appeal
granted UKSC 2020/0118 (2021).
181. Mackinnon [1986] Ch 482, 493; see Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v. Kyrs [2014] UKPC 41,
[2015] AC 616 [27] (appeal taken from Virgin Is.) (UK) (“[T]o be amenable to its personal jurisdiction
[a party] must be present within the jurisdiction or amenable to being served with the proceedings out of
the jurisdiction, and he must have submitted voluntarily.”). See generally DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ¶ 11-003 (Lord Collins of Mapesbury & Jonathan Harris eds., 15th ed. 2018)
(“[I]n England service of process is the foundation of the court’s jurisdiction to entertain a claim in
personam . . . . [W]henever a defendant can be legally served with process, then the court, on service
being effected, has jurisdiction to entertain a claim against him.”).
182. HL Deb (10 Sept. 2018) (792) col. 196GC (UK) (statement of Baroness Williams); id. (“If a
person is located outside the UK and the other conditions for granting a [COPOA] production order are
fulfilled, a production order can be served.”).
183. COPOA 2019, c. 5, §§ 9, 14, Explanatory Notes ¶ 52; Criminal Procedure Rules 2020, SI
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established. Subject matter jurisdiction may be more difficult: under UK law,
the extraterritorial scope (if any) of a statute “is a matter of subject matter
jurisdiction.”184 A statute’s extraterritorial subject matter may be express or
implied.185 Where the legislature has “provided expressly for [a statute’s]
extraterritorial application,” as the U.S. Congress did with the CLOUD Act
and the UK Parliament has with COPOA,186 UK courts will give effect to
that intent—even if inconsistent with international law.187 UK courts
normally apply a “presumption against extraterritoriality,” limiting a
statute’s extraterritoriality to avoid infringing the sovereignty of foreign
states and due to broader comity concerns.188 The House of Lords has held
that “[w]here, however, Parliament incorporates into domestic legislation an
international [agreement] which necessarily gives to that domestic
legislation extraterritorial effect in the broadest sense an entirely different

2020/759, r. 47.68(4) (UK); U.S.-UK AGREEMENT, supra note 2, arts. 5(5), 10(2); see also COPOA 2019,
c. 5, § 14(4)(d)(i) (further permitting overseas service “in accordance with arrangements made . . . by the
Secretary of State”); U.S.-UK AGREEMENT, supra note 2, arts. 6(2), 10(6). Stricter requirements as to
service in civil proceedings are irrelevant. See, e.g., R (KBR, Inc.) v. Dir. Of the Sec. Fraud Off. [2018]
EWHC (Admin) 2368, [2019] QB 675 [99(i)], overruled on other grounds by [2021] UKSC 2, [2021] 2
WLR 335 (UK) (referring to the applicant’s reliance on civil procedure rules as “the central fallacy” in
its personal jurisdiction argument, noting that “those provisions are irrelevant” to the analogous criminal
disclosure powers it was evaluating).
184. KBR [2018] EWHC (Admin) 2368 [72(i)], aff’d on this point, [2021] UKSC 2 [59] (UK); see
Masri v. Consolidated Contractors Int’l. Co. [2008] EWCA (Civ) 303, [2009] QB 45 [30] (UK) (“Subject
matter jurisdiction is concerned, inter alia, with the extent to which the law . . . applies extraterritoriality.”). See generally Jetivia SA v. Bilta Ltd. [2015] UKSC 23, [2016] 1 AC 1 [212] (appeal
taken from Eng.) (UK) (“Whether a court has . . . subject matter jurisdiction is a question of the
construction of the relevant statute.”).
185. KBR [2021] UKSC 2 [28]–[29]; DAVID FELDMAN, DIGGORY BAILEY & LUKE NORBURY,
BENNION, BAILEY, AND NORBURY ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION § 6.10 (8th ed. 2020).
186. KBR [2018] EWHC (Admin) 2368 [61]; see supra text accompanying notes 176–178.
187. E.g., Assange v. Swed. Prosecution Auth. [2012] UKSC 22, [2012] 2 AC 471(appeal taken
from Eng.) (UK) (holding that if the proper interpretation of a particular UK statute gave rise to a
“possible or likely discrepancy [with] the United Kingdom’s international obligations . . . that is in no
way impermissible . . . . It is the consequence of the United Kingdom’s dualist system [and] of
Parliamentary sovereignty . . . .”). See generally R (Miller) v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the Eur. Union
[2017] UKSC 5, [2018] AC 61 [56], [167], [244] (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK) (affirming Parliamentary
Sovereignty and the United Kingdom’s dualist approach to international law).
188. KBR, [2021] UKSC 2 [27]–[32]; see id. at [28] (“The more exorbitant the jurisdiction, the more
is likely to be required of the statutory provisions in order to rebut the presumption against extra-territorial
effect.”); Masri v. Consol. Contractors Int’l. Co. SAL [2008] EWCA (Civ) 303, [2009] QB 450 [38]–[39]
(Eng.) (noting that UK courts may limit extraterritorial jurisdiction over third parties subject to personal
jurisdiction, due to “concerns relating to international comity”); Mackinnon v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette Sec. Corp. [1986] Ch 482, 494 (Eng.) (recognizing “[t]he need to exercise the court’s jurisdiction
with due regard to the sovereignty of others”)); see also Société Eram Shipping Co. v. Cie Internationale
de Navigation [2003] UKHL 30, [2004] 1 AC 260 [67] (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK) (following
Mackinnon on this point).
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situation arises.”189 Then, “the basis for the presumption no longer exists.”190
Here, similarly, there is no need to limit extraterritorial jurisdiction to avoid
infringing U.S. sovereignty, given the U.S.-UK Agreement evidences the
United States’ consent for such extraterritoriality.191 As these jurisdictional
requirements are met, the United Kingdom therefore appears to have
significant scope to use the U.S.-UK Agreement to expand its jurisdiction
over foreign service providers.
UK courts may nonetheless constrain the extraterritorial reach of the
United Kingdom’s new COPOA/U.S.-UK Agreement powers to comply
with the prohibition against extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction or to
avoid related conflicts or comity concerns. It is beyond the scope of this
article to comprehensively address the continued state of this prohibition or
how it should be applied in today’s digital world—although these are
pressing tasks for scholars.192 It is, however, arguable that whether a state
has sufficient “consent” in this context is a multifactorial rather than binary
question.193 The “un-territorial” nature of electronic data renders it
particularly vulnerable to sovereignty claims by “overlapping
jurisdictions.”194 The fact that UK law enforcement have the consent of the
United States to serve an extraterritorial request for data on service providers
based in the United States may merely be necessary but not sufficient at
international law; other (non-consenting) states may have legitimate
sovereignty claims over that provider and/or the requested data.195 Consider,
for example, that UK law enforcement are expected to direct the bulk of their
U.S.-UK Agreement requests to global service providers.196 As noted, such
189. Holmes v. Bangl. Biman Corp. [1989] 1 AC (HL) 1112, 1148 (Lord Jauncey) (appeal taken
from Eng.); see also id. at 1132–38 (Lord Griffiths and Lord Bridges arriving at the same conclusion
pronounced by Lord Jauncey).
190. Id. at 1148.
191. See id. at 1137–38 (“In such circumstances our domestic legislation is not an interference with
the sovereignty of other countries but the recognition of their wish that we should alter our law to accord
with the common will.”).
192. See supra note 160.
193. See Asaf Lubin, The Prohibition on Extraterritorial Enforcement Jurisdiction in Cyberspace,
in ELGAR RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 4–6 (Austen L.
Parrish & Cedric Ryngaert eds., 2022 forthcoming), https:// papers.ssrn. com/sol3/ papers.cfm?
abstract_id=4012007 (proposing a multifactorial test for resolving competing claims over data in
cyberspace).
194. Anke Sophie Obendiek, What Are We Actually Talking About? Conceptualizing Data as a
Governable Object in Overlapping Jurisdictions, INT’L STUD. Q. (2021 forthcoming); Jennifer Daskal,
The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L. J. 326 (2015).
195. See Lubin, supra note 193, at 4–6.
196. See, e.g., HC Deb (30 Jan. 2019) (653) cols. 859–60 (statement of Minister Wallace) (“This
legislation [COPOA] is about the data predominantly held by Facebook and Google and everything
else . . . .”).
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providers operate in multiple jurisdictions, often in circumstances subjecting
them to data protection regimes like the GDPR.197 Data protected by the
GDPR, such as the Facebook messages of a French national, may well need
to be processed by Facebook to comply with a request by UK law
enforcement under the U.S.-UK Agreement.198 While the status of the
prohibition against extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction requires further
consideration, were a UK court to become aware of this potential French or
EU sovereignty concern, it may ultimately “read down” the subject matter
jurisdiction of COPOA on (linked) common law grounds in any event, to
avoid infringing foreign nations’ sovereignty, or for related comity
concerns.199 This is most likely to occur where compliance with a UK
COPOA order would require the responding service provider to breach
foreign law.200 Separately, it also remains debatable whether a UK court
would interpret COPOA as properly permitting orders to be issued to U.S.
service providers with no UK connections whatsoever.201 In other contexts,
UK courts have read down apparently unlimited extraterritorial jurisdiction
over foreign persons by requiring that such persons have a “sufficient
connection” to the United Kingdom.202 Such an interpretation may also be

197. See supra notes 153–154.
198. This may happen inadvertently, when UK law enforcement seek, for example, Facebook
messages of a UK national communicating with a French national. Additionally, the U.S.-UK Agreement
permits each state to directly target data of any third country national in any event. See U.S.-UK
AGREEMENT, supra note 2, art. 5(10) (providing certain default obligations when third country national
data is targeted).
199. See R (KBR, Inc.) v. Dir. of the Serious Fraud Off. [2021] UKSC 2, [2021] 2 WLR 335 [24]–
[25] (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK).
200. Bank Mellat v. HM Treasury [2019] EWCA (Civ) 499 [63(iii)] (Eng.) (“An order will not
lightly be made where compliance would entail a party to English litigation breaching its own (i.e.,
foreign) criminal law, not least with considerations of comity in mind.”); Masri v. Consol. Contractors
Int’l. Co. SAL [2008] EWCA (Civ) 303, [2009] QB 450 [47] (Eng.) (“[I]t would be an exorbitant exercise
of jurisdiction to put a third party abroad in the position of having to choose between being in contempt
of an English court and having to dishonour its obligations under a [foreign] law which does not regard
the English order as a valid excuse.”). But see Bank Mellat [2019] EWCA (Civ) 449 [63(i)] (“[T]he
English Court[] has jurisdiction to order production and inspection of documents, regardless of the fact
that compliance with the order would or might entail a breach of foreign criminal law in the ‘home’
country of the party the subject of the order.”); e.g., Owners of the Motor Vessel ‘Gravity Highway’ v.
Owners of the Motor Vessel ‘Maritime Maisie’ [2020] EWHC (Comm) 1697 [50]–[52] (Eng.) (rejecting
a party’s attempt to withhold disclosure on the basis this would “place them in breach of Korean data
protection regulations”).
201. Cf. Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Act (COPOA) 2019, c. 5 (UK). Most, but not all, of
COPOA’s service methods are for overseas providers with at least some UK operations. See supra note
183; e.g., COPOA 2019, c. 5, Explanatory Notes ¶ 52 (“Where a person has no principal office in the
UK, documents can also be served at any place in the UK where that person carries on business or
conducts business activities.”).
202. E.g., Masri [2008] EWCA (Civ) 303 [36]. These are however often based at least in part on
sovereignty concerns which, here, may not arise. Id. at [59].
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appropriate to give effect to the recipient service providers’ own “due
process” rights under Article 6(1) of the ECHR,203 although historically this
right appears to have had little impact in this context.204
(2) “Expanding Jurisdiction” Over UK Service Providers Would Also
Significantly Benefit U.S. Law Enforcement—If Permitted Under The Due
Process Clause
Just as the United States should be considered motivated to use the U.S.UK Agreement to minimize conflicts,205 it has credible reasons to want to
use direct access mechanisms for this second benefit, i.e. expanding
jurisdiction over foreign service providers. Cybercrime investigations—into
crimes which “know no borders,” operated through “complex criminal
networks . . . across the world206—are of growing importance for U.S. law
enforcement.207 They are thus likely to be particularly tempted to seek to use
CLOUD Act agreements to exercise expanded jurisdiction against service
providers harboring cybercrimnal data overseas. Indeed, U.S law
enforcement appear to have a significant appetite for data currently available
only through MLA and related cooperative mechanisms. Reported
examples—potentially representative of a much large number of analogous
criminal investigations—show that in the past few years alone U.S. law
enforcement have used MLA to obtain subscriber information, chat logs, and
other data on targets’ email, ISP, and social media accounts,208 as well as to

203. ECHR, art. 6(1) (relevantly providing that, “[i]n the determination of his civil rights and
obligations . . . everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law”).
204. Ralf Michaels, Jurisdiction, Foundations, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW J.2 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017) (noting that “due process and fair trial rights”
under Article 6(1) of the ECHR “could be viewed as limiting the exercise as jurisdiction” but “[i]n reality”
these and related laws “ha[ve] played a fairly limited role in limiting jurisdiction”). The ECtHR has found
violations of due process under Article 6(1) of the ECHR where national courts “hav[e] overstepped the
limits of [their] jurisdiction.” E.g., Sokurenko and Strygun v. Ukraine, App. No. 29458/04, ¶¶ 24–28
(ECtHR, July 20, 2006). However, it appears that the extent of such jurisdiction is treated purely as a
matter of domestic law, leaving states free to assert broad extraterritorial authority. See generally id. ¶
116 (“[I]t is for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law.”).
205. See supra Part III.A(2).
206. Cybercrime, INTERPOL (last accessed Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.interpol.int/ Crimes/ Cyb
ercrime.
207. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report of the Attorney-General’s Cyber Digital Task Force xi (2018)
(“Cyber-enabled attacks are exacting an enormous toll on American businesses, government agencies,
and families”); see Steve Morgan, Cybercrime To Cost the World $10.5 Trillion Annually by 2025,
CYBERCRIME MAG. (Nov. 13, 2020), https://cybersecurityventures.com /cybercrime-damages-6-trillionby- 2021/ (noting that “[c]ybercrime has [already] hit the U.S. so hard”).
208. United States v. Killen, 729 F. App’x 703, 714 n.7 (11th Cir. 2018) (relying on business records,
created for purpose of organization’s administration and consisting of “transactional and identifying
information, such as chat logs . . . ; photographs . . . ; bind logs . . . ; and identifying account information”
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wiretap their electronic communications.209 The Mueller Inquiry alone
“made 13 requests to foreign governments pursuant to [MLA],”210 including
(at least) one to the UK for electronic and other documents that was tied up
in court for over 15 months.211 A separate MLA request from the United
States for information UK law enforcement had gathered about suspected
terrorists operating in Syria recently took more than five years for UK courts
to resolve due to concerns that the United States would seek to use
information transmitted in criminal proceedings for which the death penalty
may be imposed.212 While that timeframe may be particularly egregious,
MLA is commonly perceived to be slow and cumbersome.213 In contrast, the
United Kingdom has given overseas service providers a default period of
seven days to respond to its U.S.-UK Agreement requests and anticipates the
entire evidence-gathering process under COPOA will take “60 days or
perhaps less.”214 Were the United States to set similar requirements on UK
service providers responding to U.S-UK Agreement requests,215 U.S. law
enforcement could therefore more swiftly obtain data from UK service
providers through this method when an opportunity arises, rather than
through MLA,216 including for criminal investigations that may ultimately

to obtain information); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Ezell, 2020 OK 55 ¶ 7, 466 P.3d 551, 553–54
(Okla. Sup. Ct. 2020) (relying on emails sent to obtain requisite information); United States v. Nikulin,
No. CR 16-00440 WHA, 2020 WL 5847518, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2020) (noting that defendant’s
mental health and medical records, defendant’s email exchanges with friends and family, and defendant’s
phone call transcripts were all reviewed).
209. United States v. Loera, 333 F. Supp. 3d 172, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
210. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN
THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 13 (2019).
211. R (Terra Servs. Ltd.) v. Nat’l Crime Agency [2020] EWHC (Admin) 1640, [2021] 1 WLR 1
[2] (Eng.); see also R (Terra Servs. Ltd.) v. Nat’l Crime Agency [2019] EWHC (Admin) 1933 [3] (Eng.)
(noting that this litigation arose from an MLA request from the Mueller Inquiry).
212. Elgizouli v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2020] UKSC 10 [16]–[61], [2020] 2 WLR 857
(appeal taken from Eng.); R (Elgizouli) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2020] EWHC (Admin)
2516 (Eng.).
213. See, e.g., CLARKE ET AL., supra note 47, at 226–27. See also Data Access Agreement Press
Release, supra note 3.
214. COPOA 2019, c. 5, § 5(5); HOME OFF., supra note 2, at 7 (UK); see Ryan Junck et al., supra
note 178 (referring to the decreased timeframe as “[p]erhaps the most significant aspect of [COPOA]”).
215. The U.S.-UK Agreement contemplates its members imposing “arrangements” and
“requirements as to the manner” data is transmitted and produced from service providers. See U.S.-UK
AGREEMENT, supra note 2, arts. 6(2), 6(4), 10(6), 10(11). These powers may possibly be used to set timeframes.
216. See, e.g., CLARKE ET AL., supra note 47, at 226–27.
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result in death penalty proceedings217—thus avoiding the extended delays
the United States has recently experienced during MLA.218
It is appropriate to acknowledge that, at present, this public
international law benefit may not be as apparent for the United States as it is
for the United Kingdom. Far more service providers from which criminal
evidence is commonly sought are currently U.S.—rather than UK—based.219
Thanks to this, as well as the broad extraterritorial scope of the SCA and
similar U.S. criminal investigatory and national security powers,220 U.S. law
enforcement can therefore readily obtain vast volumes of data for criminal
investigations with relative ease without recourse to international
arrangements. Looking ahead, however, the domination of U.S. service
providers may be lessening. There are some indications that consumer
demand for increased privacy protections, both within and outside the United
States,221 coupled with the continued failure of Congress to enact a
comprehensive data protection law,222 will cause a consumer shift to non217. Tim Cochrane, The Impact of the CLOUD Act Regime on the UK’s Death Penalty Assurances
Policy, U.K. CONST. L. BLOG (June 1, 2020), https:// ukconstitutionallaw.org/ 2020/06/01/tim-cochranethe- impact- of- the- cloud -act- regime-on- the- uks- death- penalty- assurances- policy/; see U.S.-UK
AGREEMENT, supra note 2, art. 8(4)(a).
218. See infra notes 211–213.
219. See Woods, supra note 42, at 621–22.
220. See supra note 42 (discussing the broad extraterritorial scope of the SCA): e.g., infra notes
319–320 (Wiretap Act). In certain contexts, U.S, law enforcement may also obtain criminal evidence
using extensive extraterritorial national security powers. See, e.g., The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. [hereinafter FISA]; United States v. Turner, 840 F.3d 336, 341
(7th Cir. 2016) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1806(c)) (“[W]hile the government must have a measurable foreign
intelligence purpose, other than just criminal prosecution, the amended FISA statute does not oblige the
government to demonstrate to the FISA court that its primary purpose in conducting electronic
surveillance is not criminal prosecution.”) (citation and quote marks omitted). But see, e.g., Asha
Rangappa, It Ain’t Easy Getting a FISA Warrant: I Was an FBI Agent and Should Know, JUST SEC. (Mar.
6, 2017), https:// www. justsecurity. org/38422/aint-easy-fisa- warrant- fbi-agent/ (arguing that the use of
FISA powers for criminal investigations is difficult).
221. See CONSUMERS INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNET SOCIETY, THE TRUST OPPORTUNITY:
EXPLORING CONSUMERS’ ATTITUDES TO THE INTERNET OF THINGS 1, 3 (2019), https:// www.
internetsociety. org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CI_IS_Joint_Report-EN.pdf (surveying “consumers in
Australia, Canada, France, Japan, UK and the US” and concluding that, “[g]iven the level of concern
amongst owners and non-owners, there is potential for companies to use high levels of privacy and
security as a way to stand out from the crowd and build trust with current and future customers”); PEW
RSCH. CTR., AMERICANS AND PRIVACY: CONCERNED, CONFUSED AND FEELING LACK OF CONTROL
OVER THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION 15 (2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/ internet/2019/11/15/
americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-infor matio
n/ (“Seven-in-ten Americans say they feel as if their data is less secure today than it was five years ago”).
222. See Opinion, Congress Should Act on Privacy, Rather Than Leaving the Job to Regulators,
WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2021, 2:52PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/09/30/congressshould- act-privacy-rather-than-leaving-job-regulators/; Jessica Rich, After 20 Years of Debate, It’s Time
for Congress to Finally Pass a Baseline Privacy Law, BROOKINGS (Jan. 14, 2021), https:// www.
brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/01/14/after-20-years-of-debate-its-time-for-congress-to-finally- pass-
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U.S. based providers claiming to be beyond the reach of U.S. law.223
Although it is likely too soon to speak of the imminent demise of U.S. service
providers’ global domination, U.S. law enforcement should not be
complacent. Indeed, an ongoing DOJ Inspector-General Audit indicates they
are not; this states that the Office of International Affairs (OIA) within DOJ
“will need to allocate resources, including attorneys and support personnel
to carry out [its new issuing] role” under CLOUD Act agreements.224 As the
OIA will have responsibility only for outgoing U.S. requests under CLOUD
Act agreements, not incoming foreign requests,225 this is compelling
evidence that, despite the United States’ public statements suggesting
otherwise,226 it anticipates making ample use of the U.S.-UK Agreement and
similar future agreements, for one or both of the two benefits this Part III has
outlined so far.
Assuming then that the United States is motivated to use CLOUD Act
agreements to expand jurisdiction over foreign providers in the manner
outlined, a further question remains whether it is capable of doing so under
U.S. law. On this point, the United Kingdom’s interpretation of the U.S.-UK
Agreement as allowing it to expand jurisdiction extraterritorially should
guide the United States’ own interpretation of this agreement under U.S.
law.227 Indeed, at first glance, the U.S. jurisdictional issues appear similar to
those in the United Kingdom: “A court must have the power to decide the
claim before it (subject-matter jurisdiction) and power over the parties before

a-baseline-privacy-law/.
223. E.g., 10 Reasons to Choose Mailo Pro for Your Business or Organization, MAILO BLOG (Apr.
15, 2021), https://blog.mailo.com/ blog/en/10-reasons-to-choose-mailo-pro.htm (“[T]he data is securely
hosted in France and is not subject to the American CLOUD Act[.]”); Northern Data Closes Acquisition
of Data Center Site in Northern Sweden and Continues Successful Expansion Driven by Enormous
Demand, BUSINESS WIRE (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.businesswire.com/news/ home/20210308005295/
en/ Northern-Data-closes-acquisition-of-data-center-site-in-Northern-Sweden-and-continues-successfulexpansion-driven-by-enormous-demand (“As a European company, we are not subject to the U.S. Cloud
Act[.]”); see, e.g., Anthony Cuthbertson, Whatsapp Sees Sudden Drop in Downloads as Millions Turn to
Telegram and Signal, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 15 ,2021), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgetsand -tech/whatsapp-privacy-update-signal-telegram-b1787831.html. While WhatsApp is a U.S. service
provider, Telegram is formally not.
224. DOJ IG AUDIT, supra note 71, at 19.
225. AG Order No. 4877-2020, 85 Fed. Reg. 67446-01 (Oct. 23, 2020) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
§ 0.64–6); see U.S.-U.K. AGREEMENT, supra note 2, arts. 1(8), 5(5)–(12).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 68–83.
227. See Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 137 S. Ct. 1504, 1512 (2017) (“[T]his Court has given
considerable weight to the views of other parties to a treaty.”) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). UK law takes a similar approach. See, e.g., T v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1996] AC
742 (HL) 779 (Lord Lloyd) (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK) (“In a case concerning an international
convention it is obviously desirable that decisions in different jurisdictions should, so far possible, be
kept in line with each other.”).
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it (personal jurisdiction) before it can resolve a case.”228 The relative
significance of these two jurisdictional requirements is, however, inverse in
the United States. “Subject matter jurisdiction” to issue an SCA order
appears straightforward:229 it is established where the court has subject
matter jurisdiction over the underlying offense being investigated.230
Assuming the SCA order is sought to investigate U.S. criminal offenses—
over which federal courts have jurisdiction231—subject matter jurisdiction
should therefore arise. Unlike in the United Kingdom, in the United States,
the territorial reach of the SCA is not a question of subject matter
jurisdiction.232 Nonetheless, while not a jurisdictional issue in that narrow
sense,233 Daskal’s argument about the (lack of) extraterritorial reach of the
SCA or CLOUD Act has practical significance and is addressed below.234
Personal jurisdiction is a different story. It is widely accepted that “[a]
federal court will enforce an investigative subpoena issued to a foreign
national when it has personal jurisdiction over the subpoenaed party.”235 The
Supreme Court recently affirmed that “[t]he canonical decision in this area
remains International Shoe.”236 This held that personal jurisdiction
228. Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct 553, 562 (2017).
229. See generally Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587 (1999) (“[I]n most instances
subject-matter jurisdiction will involve no arduous inquiry.”).
230. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (b)(1)(A), (c)(1)(A), 3(d) (providing that SCA orders may be issued
by any “court of competent jurisdiction”); 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3)(A)(i) (defining this term in part to mean
“any district court of the United States that . . . has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated”); e.g.,
United States v. Hopkins, No. 19-10135-EFM, 2020 WL 5642354, at *1–2 (D. Kan. Sept. 22, 2020); U.S.
v. Rogers, No. 18-10018-EFM, 2019 WL 339590, at *6 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2019); United States v. Shultz,
No. 16-10107-01-EFM, 2018 WL 534333, at *7 (D. Kan. Jan. 24, 2018); United States v. Search of Info.
Associated with Fifteen Email Addresses, No. 2:17-CM-3152-WC, 2017 WL 4322826, at *3 (M.D. Ala.
Sept. 28, 2017), on reconsideration sub nom. United States v. Search of Info. Associated with Fifteen
Email Addresses, No. 2:17-CM-3152-WKW, 2017 WL 8751915 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 1, 2017). See generally
United States Cath. Conf. v. Abortion Rts. Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988) (noting, in the civil
context, that “if a district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying action, and
the process was not issued in aid of determining that jurisdiction, then the process is void”).
231. See United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 65 (1951) (“The District Court ha[s] jurisdiction of
offenses against the laws of the United States.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3231).
232. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 253–54 (2010) (rejecting the argument
that “the extraterritorial reach of [a statute] raise[s] a question of subject-matter jurisdiction”); id. at 254
(“[T]o ask what conduct [the statute] reaches is to ask what conduct [it] prohibits, which is a merits
question. Subject-matter jurisdiction, by contrast, refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
233. See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011) (“We have urged that
a rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it governs a court’s . . . subject-matter or personal
jurisdiction.”).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 89–90; infra Part IV.B(2).
235. E.g., Silverman v. Berkson, 141 N.J. 412, 423 (1995) (citing In re Sealed Case, 832 F.3d 1268,
1262 (D.D.C. Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988)).
236. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (citing Int’l Shoe
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ordinarily requires two findings:237 first, that the nonresident party has
“certain minimum contacts” with the forum;238 and, secondly, that asserting
jurisdiction over the party would be “reasonable in the circumstances.”239
While typically “the issue of minimum contacts does not arise in criminal
cases”240—the physical presence of a criminal defendant before a court may
establish personal jurisdiction241—courts apply the civil minimum contacts
standard when asked to issue subpoenas and similar instruments to
disinterested third parties like service providers during criminal
investigations.242 The United States’ position, set out in its White Paper, is
that “personal jurisdiction” constraints deny U.S. law enforcement the ability
to use the U.S.-UK Agreement to expand enforcement jurisdiction at public
international law. The focus of the remaining Part IV of this article evaluates
this position.

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
237. Personal jurisdiction can be further divided into “two types . . . : ‘general’ (sometimes called
‘all-purpose’) jurisdiction and ‘specific’ (sometimes called ‘case-linked’) jurisdiction.” Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct 1773, 1780 (2017). General jurisdiction arises “only where
a defendant is ‘essentially at home’ in the [forum],” and is therefore presumably inapplicable here. Ford
Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1024 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011)).
238. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct at 1785–86 (citations omitted). This first factor is often divided
into two parts. Id. (“First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State or have purposefully directed its conduct [there]. Second, the
plaintiff’s claim must “‘[A]rise out of or relate to” the defendant’s forum conduct.”) (quotation marks
and citations omitted). For this article’s purposes, however, it is sufficient to refer generally to the
“contacts” requirement. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. § 422, Cmt. a (AM. L.
INST. 2018) (referring generically to “the contacts prong” of “[t]he due-process analysis”); see also Ford
Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1033 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[A]rise out of’ and ‘relate to’ overlap and are not
really two discrete grounds for jurisdiction.”).
239. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1786 (citations omitted).
240. United States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
241. E.g., United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A federal district court
has personal jurisdiction to try any defendant brought before it on a federal indictment charging a
violation of federal law.”) (citing United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659–70 (1992)); see
also infra notes 265–267.
242. In re Sealed Case, 932 F.3d 915, 922–27 (D.C. Cir. 2019); In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268,
1272–74 (D.C. Cir. 1987), abrogated by Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); In re Marc Rich
& Co., 707 F.2d 663, 666–70 (2d Cir. 1983). For analysis of the personal jurisdiction distinction between
criminal defendants and third parties from which disclosure is compelled during criminal investigations,
see United States v. Halkbank, No. 15 CR. 867 (RMB), 2020 WL 5849512, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020);
United States v. Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S., 426 F. Supp. 3d 23, 37–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); and United
States v. Maruyasu Indus. Co., 229 F.Supp.3d 659, 669 (S.D. Ohio 2017).
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IV. CAN THE UNITED STATES MAKE FULL USE OF CLOUD ACT
AGREEMENTS?
The two potential benefits CLOUD Act agreements provide at
international law should now be clear. While commentary to date doubts the
United States’ motivation to use these agreements at all243—a view Part III
critiqued—the United States’ legal ability to take advantage of the first
benefit, minimizing conflicts, as a matter of domestic U.S. law does not
appear to be questioned.244 In contrast, the United States has expressly denied
that CLOUD Act agreements give it any greater scope to gain data from
foreign service providers.245 Part IV primarily critiques that view, as well as
the related argument that this analysis is merely theoretical.
A. Personal Jurisdiction Under The Due Process Clause And CLOUD Act
Agreements
(1) The U.S.-UK Agreement Enhances U.S. Law Enforcement’s Ability
To Assert “Minimum Contacts” Over Foreign Service Providers
Even if we assume, as the White Paper does, that a U.S. court must be
satisfied that the “minimum contacts” test for personal jurisdiction is
fulfilled before an SCA order to a foreign service provider will be made,246
the U.S.-UK Agreement may contribute to a finding that minimum contacts
exist—if not supply sufficient contacts altogether. Where a federal court is
asked to issue an SCA order, the Fifth Amendment, which protects both legal
and natural persons,247 governs the personal jurisdiction Due Process

243. See supra text accompanying notes 66–75.
244. See supra note 97. The CLOUD Act does, curiously, include a new enhanced comity defense,
sitting alongside the existing common law test, see supra note 115, explained further at Part IV.B(2)
below. CLOUD Act, § 103(b), 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h). The existence of this new defense may imply a
failure to appreciate the private international law benefit of CLOUD Act agreements by drafters, as it
appears largely redundant. Since CLOUD Act agreements require each state to lift all blocking statutes
in their own law, see supra Part II.A(1), providers would only face a material risk of violating the law of
a CLOUD Act agreement member state if that state had failed to implement this obligation or if, despite
the ease, U.S. law enforcement failed to channel an SCA request through a CLOUD Act agreement. See
supra text accompanying note 117.
245. See supra notes 76–84.
246. See supra notes 81–76.
247. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 24 S. Ct. 436, 444 (1904); see Johnathon W. Ellison,
Trust the Process? Rethinking Due Process and the President’s Emergency Powers over the Digital
Economy, 71 DUKE L.J. 499, 531 (2021) (discussing “technology companies” in particular).
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inquiry.248 As the SCA permits nationwide service,249 the “forum” with
which the recipient of the order must have minimum contacts is the United
States overall.250 The Supreme Court has indeed repeatedly emphasized that
“it is the defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary connection with
the forum State that is the basis for its jurisdiction over him.”251 Following
enactment of the CLOUD Act, many foreign service providers now
248. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) (The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the States, from depriving any person of property without ‘due process of law.’); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 26 (1964) (“Due process of law is secured against invasion by the federal Government
by the Fifth Amendment, and is safeguarded against state action in identical words by the Fourteenth.”)
(quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942)); e.g., United States v. Leora, 333 F. Supp. 3d 172,
184 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (evaluating whether extraterritorial digital searches “violate[d] defendant’s Fifth
Amendment due process rights”); see also In re Search Warrant Issued to Google, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 3d
1268, 1272 (N.D. Ala. 2017) (implying that Due Process personal jurisdiction analysis for the purposes
of the SCA is undertaken “pursuant to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”) (quoting Republic
of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 942 (11th Cir. 1997)). See generally
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (“The Fifth Amendment, like all the other guaranties
in the first eight amendments, applies only to proceedings by the federal government.”). For discussion
of jurisdictional issues arising when a state court issues an SCA order, see Peters et al., supra note 7, at
1079–84.
249. United States v. Ackies, 918 F.3d 190, 201–02 (1st Cir. 2019); United States v. Bansal, 663
F.3d 634, 662 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Berkos, 543 F.3d 392, 396–98 (7th Cir. 2008); see United
States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp. 3d 59, 75–83 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (outlining the history of the SCA’s
nationwide service provision and collecting cases on this point).
250. “Unless a federal statute otherwise provides,” a federal court’s jurisdiction “is keyed to that of
a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which it sits,” in which case “the scope of the minimumcontacts inquiry” by the federal court mirrors what it “would be under the Fourteenth Amendment for a
claim in state court: confined to contacts with the forum state.” In re Sealed Case, 932 F.3d 915, 924–25
(D.C. Cir. 2019). Where a federal statute provides for nationwide service, however, courts have held that
the “the Fifth Amendment requires only ‘minimum contacts with the United States’ as a whole—rather
than with the forum state.” Id. (citing SEC v. Bilzerian, 378 F.3d 1100, 1106 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); Livnat
v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see Stephen E. Sachs, The Unlimited Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 106 VIRG. L. REV. 1703, 1704 n.6 (2020) (collecting authorities). But see BristolMyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct 1773, 1783–84 (2017) (leaving this point open); see
also Livnat, 851 F.3d at 55 n.6 (“Some courts have also suggested that under the Fifth Amendment, even
if the defendant has sufficient nationwide contacts, a plaintiff must additionally justify jurisdiction in the
particular state.”).
251. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014); see id. (“We have consistently rejected attempts to
satisfy the defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the
plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum State.”); Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S.
Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021) (“The plaintiff’s claims, we have often stated, ‘must arise out of or relate to the
defendant’s contacts’ with the forum.”); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)
(“The relationship must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum State.”);
c.f., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (“The placement of a product
into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward
the forum State.”). The Supreme Court has also recently suggested a strict approach to assessing a
corporation’s contacts with the United States is appropriate, albeit in a very different context. E.g., Nestle
USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1937 (2021) (considering when corporate actions “establish domestic
application of the” Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
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expressly market themselves as being beyond U.S. jurisdiction.252 At face
value, it is therefore initially attractive to suppose a U.S. court would reject
an SCA application directed to such foreign service providers, assuming the
providers had not, at least, deliberately sought out U.S. clients or made
equivalent contacts with the United States.253 But whether this remains true
for UK service providers is far from clear following the U.S.-UK Agreement.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., the Supreme Court
restated the purpose of its personal jurisdiction requirements, saying these
“derive from and reflect two sets of values—treating defendants fairly and
protecting ‘interstate federalism.’”254 Fairness requires that parties have
notice or “fair warning—knowledge that a particular activity may subject
[them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”255 A U.S. court may
ultimately consider that the U.S.-UK Agreement provides or supports such
notice to UK service providers. Nearly two years have now elapsed since
this international agreement was announced by the two countries as
providing the United States with “reciprocal access” to data from UK service
providers.256 Its reciprocal nature was emphasized repeatedly during UK
Parliamentary debates and related materials,257 as well as in other UK
commentary.258 A court may conclude that service providers subject to UK
252. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
253. See U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 8 (“The more a company has purposefully directed its
conduct into the United States, the more likely a court will find the company is subject to U.S.
jurisdiction.”).
254. Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 293 (1980)).
255. Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472); see Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312
(1992) (“We have . . . often identified “notice” or “fair warning” as the analytic touchstone of due process
nexus analysis.”), overruled on other grounds by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
256. See supra note 71.
257. E.g., HL Deb (11 July 2018) (792) col. 924 (remarks of Lord Rosser) (“[T]he CLOUD Act . . .
requires that when the [U.S. ]concludes an agreement with another country, such as the UK, that country
must allow the [U.S.] reciprocal rights of data access.”); HL Deb (5 Sept. 2018) (792) col. 136GC
(remarks of Lord Paddick) (“[P]resumably the countries that enter into international co-operation
agreements with the UK . . . will expect their own law enforcement agencies to be able to apply through
their own domestic courts for equivalent orders that would allow them to seek stored electronic data
directly from service providers based in the UK; the reciprocal agreement.”); Crime (Overseas Production
Orders) Bill 2018-19, HL Bill [293] Explanatory Notes ¶ 18 (UK) (“Any international agreement between
the UK and another country may be reciprocal, allowing law enforcement agencies in that country to
require that data is produced by companies based in the UK.”).
258. E.g., Barnett, Black & Manson, supra note 89 (“The [U.S.-UK] Agreement creates a reciprocal
framework which also allows for the transfer of data from the UK to the U.S.”); Shaul Brazil & Jonathan
Flynn, Overseas Production Orders – A New Tool for UK Law Enforcement, BCL SOLICITORS LLP (Feb.
26, 2019), https:// www.bcl.com/ overseas- production- orders-a- new-tool-for- uk-law-enforcement/
(“[CLOUD Act regime agreements] enable ‘qualifying foreign governments’ to request electronic data
from the [U.S.] in exchange for reciprocal arrangements that allow the [U.S.] to request electronic data
from that country.”).
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(and now, potentially U.S.) jurisdiction have had sufficient notice and thus
ample time to re-structure their affairs off-shore to avoid exposure if
necessary.259 That approach is supported by analogous criminal
precedents.260 Of course, the civil and criminal personal jurisdiction
requirements typically differ markedly.261 Nonetheless, U.S. courts may
draw on criminal precedents, given the underlying criminal context of the
U.S.-UK Agreement and SCA.262 As noted, the U.S.-UK Agreement
provides the United Kingdom’s international law consent to the United
States expanding jurisdiction over UK service providers.263 U.S. courts often
hold that foreign state consent, whether provided thorough an international
agreement or merely informally,264 provides personal jurisdiction over
foreign defendants seized overseas.265 For example, the majority of U.S.
Circuits to have determined the jurisdictional reach of the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), which provides for extraterritorial
259. See Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (noting that, given “fair warning,” “[a] defendant can
thus ‘structure [its] primary conduct’ to lessen or avoid exposure to a given [country’s] courts.”) (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
260. See also Dan E. Stigall, International Law and Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 377–80 (2012) (discussing
the limits of such an approach but recognizing that areas of law may be on a continuum between civil and
criminal).
261. See supra notes 240–241 and accompanying text..
262. Both are intended to further criminal investigations. The U.S.-UK Agreement allows orders
“for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the prevention, detection, investigation, or
prosecution” of certain serious crimes. See U.S.-UK Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 1(5), 1(11), 4(1),
10(3). SCA orders must be sought to obtain “evidence of a crime,” to otherwise obtain data “relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation,” or similar. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (d) (partly incorporating
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)).
263. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
264. See United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998); see also supra note 172 (setting
out the same position at international law that foreign state consent may be provided informally).
265. E.g., United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 553 (4th Cir. 2012) (“With Afghanistan having
disclaimed any interest in prosecuting criminal conduct [pursuant to an international agreement with the
United States] by those situated similarly to Brehm, due process is not offended by the United States
stepping into the jurisdictional void.”); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[A]
state has jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce a rule of law in the territory of another state to the extent
provided by international agreement with the other state.”); United States v. Martinelli, 62 M.J. 52, 81
(C.A.A.F. 2005) (“Appellant’s prosecution for these crimes [overseas] was not merely tolerated by
German authorities, it was officially condoned pursuant to an international treaty.”); see Laker Airways
Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting, in a civil context,
that “far from conferring any immunity [as defendants claimed], their treaties contain express language
subjecting them to the jurisdiction of the United States over predatory pricing and abuse of monopoly
power.”); see also United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Fair warning does not
require that the defendants understand that they could be subject to criminal prosecution in the United
States so long as they would reasonably understand that their conduct was criminal and would subject
them to prosecution somewhere.”). See generally Bruce A. Baird, Stranger in a Strange Land: Asserting
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Strangers, 8 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2020) (elaborating on criminal jurisdiction in
the United States over noncitizen, nonresident defendants).
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enforcement of drug laws at sea,266 have held that consent by the flag state is
sufficient for the United States to assert personal jurisdiction over ships at
sea.267
In any event, “considerations sometimes serve to establish the
reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts
than would otherwise be required.”268 In the international context, the
“interstate federalism” issues that the second stage of this analysis (i.e.
reasonableness) would normally take into account transform:269 before
permitting personal jurisdiction over foreign persons, a court should
“consider the procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose
interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction,” “as well as the Federal
interest in” the United States’ own “foreign relations policies.”270 Although
these international factors often countenance against permitting
extraterritorial personal jurisdiction, they predominantly point in the
opposite direction here. Permitting extraterritorial personal jurisdiction over
UK service providers by U.S. law enforcement will further, rather than
undermine, both the United States’ and United Kingdom’s policy goals of
preventing, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting crime.271 This is after
266. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. § 705 et seq. (2018). While personal
jurisdiction questions under MDLEA also engage the Fifth Amendment, MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach
has in part turned on particular Constitutional provisions relating to the sea. See United States v. Carvajal,
925 F. Supp. 2d 219, 249–60 (D.D.C. 2013). Nonetheless, its analysis of personal jurisdiction in the
criminal arena coheres with examples in other criminal contexts. See supra note 265.
267. United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 669–70 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Perez-Oviedo,
281 F.3d 400, 402–03 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 627–28 (5th Cir.
2001); United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2000); Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553. The Ninth
Circuits requires a “nexus” in this context—similar to “minimum contacts”—even where flag state
consent arises. E.g., United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1169 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[C]onsent . . . does
not eliminate the nexus requirement”).
268. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); see also Gourdine v. Karl Storz
Endoscopy-Am., Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 475, 483 (D.S.C. 2016) (“‘[M]inimum contacts’ and
‘reasonableness’ are not independent requirements; rather, they are aspects of the [overall] requirement[s]
of due process.”) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace,
41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 15 n.53 (1996) (“The best way to combine the two considerations is to realize that
when minimum contacts analysis results in a close question, fair play and substantial justice factors should
have greater weight.”). Various Circuits have offered similar views. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre
Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2006); OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 149 F.3d 1086,
1092 (10th Cir. 1998); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 568 (2d Cir. 1996);
Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1st Cir. 1994).
269. See supra note 254.
270. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987); see also id. at 115
(emphasizing that a “careful inquiry . . . into reasonableness” is required in the international context);
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 140 (2014) (similarly recognizing that “the transnational context
of this dispute bears attention”); Int’l Techs. Consultants, Inc. v. Euroglas S.A., 107 F.3d 386, 394 (6th
Cir. 1997) (noting that the interests of “foreign nation[s] . . . merit particular respect in [U.S.] courts”).
271. See Data Access Agreement Press Release, supra note 3 (quoting representatives of both
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all the precise aim of the U.S.-UK Agreement, a primary function of which
is to permit expanded personal jurisdiction by removing blocking statutes.272
Such U.S. extraterritorial personal jurisdiction, moreover, will merely mirror
and thus be reciprocal with the United Kingdom’s own plans.273 Against this,
potentially, are the interests of other states who may claim jurisdiction over
persons and/or data—similar to the UK “subject matter jurisdiction” analysis
above.274 Nearly all additional factors typical to assessing reasonableness
are, however, supportive.275 For example, the “judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies” favors
extraterritoriality;276 the alternative—requiring U.S. law enforcement to
obtain data from UK service providers through MLA or similar methods—
would likely take months or years.277 The only other factor pointing away,
the “burden on the defendant,” would likely be given little weight in this
countries emphasizing the significance of these policies); e.g., In re Nazi Era Cases Against German
Defendants Litig., 320 F. Supp. 2d 402, 231 (D.N.J. 2004), aff’d, 153 F. App’x. 819 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It
would be hard to find a case where the procedural and substantive policies of another country would be
more affected by the assertion of state jurisdiction than this case.”); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013) (“[A]ccepting petitioners’ view would imply that other nations,
also applying the law of nations, could hale our citizens into their courts for alleged violations of the law
of nations occurring in the United States, or anywhere else in the world.”); cf. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 141–
42 (warning that “expansive views” of personal jurisdiction over foreign persons may interfere with
foreign states’ actions, as well as the United States’ “negotiation of international agreements”).
272. See supra Part III.B; see also, e.g., Oceanografia v. Hernandez, No. 13-10-00223-CV, 2011
WL 6142789, at *11–12 (Tex. App. Dec. 8, 2011) (similarly noting that the United States and Mexico
“have a shared . . . interest” through an international agreement and concluding that there were “strong
interests on both sides of the border in this case to enforce the trial court’s personal jurisdiction”) (citing
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)). The interests the Agreement seeks to further would
be viewed as substantial by U.S. courts. See, e.g., Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. De
Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (referring to the United States’ “‘substantial
interest’ in enforcing . . . laws” as relevant to the reasonableness of its assertion of personal jurisdiction
over foreign parties); see also Reyes v. Marine Mgmt. & Consulting, Ltd., 586 So. 2d 103, 117 (La. 1991)
(“Other nations likewise have an interest in seeing that their residents have redress for injuries and in
seeing that actions against their corporations are tried in appropriate forums.”). See generally Brabeau v.
SMB Corp., 789 F. Supp. 873, 878 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (“Every state wishes to shield its citizens from
harm and provide an avenue for redress.”).
273. See supra Part III.B(1). See generally Daimler, 571 U.S. at 151 (cautioning that the United
States should act with “reciprocal fairness” when asserting extraterritorial personal jurisdiction).
274. See supra text accompanying notes 184–204 (outlining the UK’s subject matter jurisdiction
jurisprudence); e.g., Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 95, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“England is
not the only nation whose policies could be impinged upon by the exercise of personal jurisdiction [here].
The interests of the European Union are also affected.”).
275. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 115 (synthesizing these in the international context)
(citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). These factors include
“the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief.” Id. at 113. Here, U.S. law
enforcement is the titular plaintiff, while the “forum” is the United States itself. The United States has
substantial interests in asserting extraterritorial personal jurisdiction here. See supra note 272.
276. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292.
277. See supra Part II.A.

COCHRANE MACROS(DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

HIDING IN THE EYE OF THE STORM CLOUD

4/10/2022 9:48 PM

201

context, where the “defendant” is a mere “disinterested third party” not at
risk of “defending a full-scale trial proceeding.”278
(2) “Minimum Contacts” And/Or Due Process Altogether May Be
Entirely Inapplicable
The preceding section assumed the correctness of the White Paper’s
claim that “minimum contacts” personal jurisdiction would be necessary to
assert jurisdiction over foreign service providers under CLOUD Act
agreements. This is, however, seriously arguable. It is questionable whether
a minimum contacts analysis of the type attempted above is appropriate in
this context or indeed under the Fifth Amendment altogether. The
circumstances in which service providers may be within the personal
jurisdiction of the United States given a mere “virtual” presence through
Internet operations has been questioned but left undetermined by the
Supreme Court.279 The Court also very recently indicated it may abandon the
entire “minimum contacts” framework of International Shoe entirely in Ford
Motor Co.280 Lower courts have also referred to “[t]he case law discussing
the specific issue of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations in the
criminal context”—arguably relevant here281—as “surprisingly sparse and
poorly developed.”282 Any of these ambiguities may be seized upon to
support extraterritorial personal jurisdiction over foreign service providers
in this context.

278. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 112; SEC v. Marin, 982 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir.
2020); see In re Search Warrant, No. 6:05-MC-168-ORL-31JGG, 2005 WL 3844032, at *5 n.14 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 13, 2006) (“The only person conceivably being inconvenienced is the third party that owns the
out-of-district property subject to the search warrant, but as a practical matter, such inconvenience is de
minimis.”); see also Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1462 (6th Cir. 1991) (suggesting the burden
on a foreign defendant was relatively low because “the judicial systems of Canada and the United States
are rooted in the same common law traditions,” a comparison that could also be made about the United
Kingdom).
279. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1028–29 n.4 (2021) (“[W]e
do not here consider internet transactions, which may raise doctrinal questions of their own.”); Walden
v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 n.9 (2014) (“[T]his case does not present the very different questions whether
and how a defendant’s virtual ‘presence’ and conduct translate into ‘contacts’ with a particular State.”).
280. Justice Gorsuch, supported by Justice Thomas, criticized “International Shoe’s increasingly
doubtful dichotomy.” See Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1036–39 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Alito
expressed similar concerns, questioning “whether the case law we have developed . . . is well suited for
the way in which business is now conducted.” Id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring). The majority opinion
referred to Justice Alito’s concurrence as “[f]air enough perhaps.” Id. at 1025 n.2. International Shoe’s
days may be numbered.
281. See supra note 262 and accompanying text..
282. United States v. Chitron Elecs. Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 298, 302–04 (D. Mass. 2009); see In re
Sealed Case, 932 F.3d at 922 (quoting Boyd v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1996)) (“While the
federal constitutional requirements of personal jurisdiction in a civil setting are reasonably welldefined . . . this is not so in a criminal case.”).
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While each of these ambiguities applies equally to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, consideration of the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause invites even greater uncertainty. The Supreme Court has
expressly left open “whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same
restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court” as
required by a state court under the Fourteenth Amendment.283 Although the
various circuits have historically assumed the Fifth Amendment requires a
similar analysis,284 this is changing: in an opinion now vacated pending
rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit suggested that there are “meaningful
differences” between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in this
context,285 emphasizing the uncertainties of existing Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence.286 Similar views have been debated in the literature for
decades.287 Professor Stephen E. Sachs recently argued that the United States
“may well have authority to extend federal personal jurisdiction”
internationally “beyond the scope of ‘minimum contacts’ doctrine.”288 In
comments that appear directly applicable here, Sachs suggested that “if a
foreign nation authorized the United States to exercise jurisdiction within its
borders . . . Congress might be able to take them up on the offer,” including
by exercising jurisdiction over “contactless foreigners.”289

283. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 U.S. 1773, 1784 (2017); see Sachs, supra
note 250, at 1704–05 (“Without Supreme Court precedent on point, the courts of appeals all agree that
the Fifth Amendment requires at least the sorts of national contacts that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires of a state.”). See generally Douglass v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, 996 F.3d 289, 294 (5th
Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc granted, vacated sub nom. Douglass v. Kaisha, 2 F.4th 525 (5th Cir. 2021)
(“The Supreme Court has opined and elaborated on the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
requirements and not on the Fifth’s.”).
284. See supra note 250.
285. Douglass, 996 F.3d at 295–96.
286. See id. at 296 (“Only one of our sister circuits has thoroughly analyzed whether, in this context,
the Fourteenth Amendment and Fifth Amendment standards are the same . . . . We find unpersuasive [its]
conclusion that Fifth Amendment due process standards must track those imposed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”) (citing Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
287. Compare Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment
Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1262–63 (1992) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment should
impose substantial limits on the United States’ ability to enact extraterritorial legislation), with A. Mark
Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COL. J. TRANS. L. 379, 427
(1997) (disagreeing and concluding that the Fifth Amendment imposes no territorial limitations on the
“extent to which Congress can enact legislation with extraterritorial effect”); see also, e.g., Anthony J.
Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1107 (2011) (“[I]t is far from
clear that Fifth Amendment due process even cares about other nations’ sovereignty interests.”). These
chime with similar concerns in related regulatory fields. See Buxbaum, supra note 174, at 280–93.
288. Sachs, supra note 250, at 1728; see id. at 1729 (“In general, Congress can extend the federal
courts’ personal jurisdiction as far as it wants.”).
289. Id. at 1729–31.
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This debate has been fermented in part by the increasingly nationalistic
approach to constitutional rights in U.S. courts—potentially providing a
further reason for doubting that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause
constrains extraterritorial U.S. law enforcement action here. The Supreme
Court has recently stated that “it is long settled as a matter of American
constitutional law that foreign citizens outside U. S. territory do not possess
rights under the U. S. Constitution.”290 Such rights apparently only crystalize
when foreign persons have traveled to the United States and developed
substantial connections there.291 Regardless of the correctness of that
position,292 it echoes—and significantly expands—the curtailing of foreign
persons’ constitutional rights undertaken by the Court in recent decades.293
As scholars and courts have recognized, this curtailment of rights raises an
obvious “paradox” for a personal jurisdiction analysis in the context of a
foreign person: the precise factor that should ordinarily allow foreign parties
to dispute personal jurisdiction—a lack of “minimum contacts” with the

290. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2082, 2086 (2020).
291. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–75 (1990).
292. See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev., 140 S. Ct. at 2099–2100 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (doubting this
analysis, stating that “the majority’s blanket assertion about the extraterritorial reach of our Constitution
does not reflect the current state of the law”). I have critiqued this in relation to CLOUD Act agreements
and the Fourth Amendment elsewhere. See Cochrane, supra note 33, at 90–97.
293. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265–75; Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1985). This approach also predominates within the D.C. Circuit in
particular. See, e.g., Bade v, De’t if State, No. 21-CV-01678 (APM), 2021 WL 3403938, at *2 (DD.C.
Aug. 4, 2021); Deripaska v. Yellen, No. 19-CV-00727(APM), 2021 WL 2417425, at *11 (D.D.C. June
13, 2021), appeal filed (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2021) (concluding that defendant “lacks standing to pursue his
due process challenge to his designations”); Al Hela v. Trump, 972 F.3d 120, 138–50 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(“[A]s an alien detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States, [appellant] may not invoke
the protection of the Due Process Clause.”); Ali v. Trump, 959 F.3d 364, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Randolph,
S.C.J., concurring) (“The detainees were not entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause because
the Supreme Court has decided that aliens outside of the United States do not qualify as ‘any person’
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”).
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United States—is the same factor that apparently stops them from raising
this objection.294 There is no consensus on how to resolve this.295
Personal jurisdiction law in the United States in “doctrinal disarray.”296
The purposes of the analysis above is not to predict, and certainly not to
guide, U.S. law enforcement or courts as to the proper approach to personal
jurisdiction in this context. Instead, it seeks to underscore the uncertainty
here. Ultimately, were U.S. law enforcement to attempt to assert personal
jurisdiction over UK service providers, even ones entirely lacking
“minimum contacts” with the United States, there is therefore a real
possibility this would be sanctioned by a U.S. court—even putting the U.S.UK Agreement to one side. While these findings would be significant, even
if the prospect of such expanded jurisdiction were merely theoretical, the
final section of Part IV explains that such expanded jurisdiction may already
be entirely possible.
B. The Prospect of U.S. Law Enforcement Expanding Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Service Providers Is Not Merely Theoretical
(1) The United States Is Not Bound By The White Paper
This first point can be stated very briefly. The United States is not
constrained by the narrow approach to personal jurisdiction it has taken in
the White Paper. It is “purely informational.”297 To the extent it still
294. E.g., Sachs, supra note 250, at 1741–42 (referring to this as “a doctrinal puzzle”); Austen L.
Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 33 (2006) (“Aliens abroad with no connection to the United States have no
constitutional rights but, under current personal jurisdictional law, paradoxically have the strongest claim
that the Due Process Clause prohibits a U.S. court from asserting jurisdiction over them.”); GSS Grp.
Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 815–16 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (referring to the debate over whether
aliens who otherwise lack constitutional rights have due process rights for jurisdictional purposes); United
States v. Ologeanu, No. 5:18-CR-81-REW-MAS, 2020 WL 1676802, at *27 n.34 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 4, 2020);
see also FBME Bank Ltd. v. Lew, 209 F. Supp. 3d 299, 328 (D.D.C. 2016) (suggesting that a foreign
corporation “ha[d] likely not met its burden to establish an entitlement to due process as a general matter”)
(citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271). See generally Robin J. Effron, Solving the Nonresident Alien
Due Process Paradox in Personal Jurisdiction, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 123, 129 (2018) (elaborating
on these ideas).
295. Compare, e.g., Douglass v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, 996 F.3d 289, 295 (5th
Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, vacated sub nom. Douglass v. Kaisha, 2 F.4th 525 (5th Cir. 2021)
(“[F]airness concerns suggest that the Fifth Amendment’s clause should preclude foreign nonresident
defendants with no ties to the United States from being called upon to defend suits in the United States.”),
with Sachs, supra note 250, at 1743 (“If Congress wants to summon the coffee farmers and shirtmakers
of the world, it can.”).
296. Anthony J. Colangelo, What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1324
(2014).
297. Ben Barnett et al., Actual Impact of 2018 U.S. CLOUD Act Still Hazy, DECHERT (July 22, 2019),
https://info.dechert.com/10/12598/july-2019/actual-impact-of-2018-u.s.-cloud-act-still-hazy.asp?sid= 0a
0 05 ac3-1df4-43c4-a944- f723188079ce# (“[S]uch white papers – should they be viewed as ‘guidance
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represents the United States’ good faith interpretation of the U.S.-UK
Agreement,298 there is no impediment on the United States changing this
interpretation swiftly.299 Ultimately, it will be for U.S. courts to interpret the
U.S.-UK Agreement.300
In any event, while the White Paper leaves its reader with the
impression that nothing much has changed,301 when read closely it actually
appears to leave scope for CLOUD Act agreements to be used to expand
personal jurisdiction in the manner articulated above. Even assuming a
“minimum contacts” personal jurisdiction analysis is applicable—a
debatable point302—while a CLOUD Act agreement will not “by itself”
expand U.S. law enforcement’s personal jurisdiction over foreign service
providers,303 it may at least facilitate such an expansion of jurisdiction, as
part of a “fact-specific inquiry” into personal jurisdiction.304

documents’ – are purely informational, do not rise to the level of regulation or rule, and are not legally
binding on the Department.”) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual §1-19.000 (2018)); cf. Perez v.
Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 95–97 (2015) (elaborating on the circumstances in which federal
agencies must consult before changing their own interpretations of rules).
298. This is arguably doubtful because the U.S.-UK Agreement post-dates the White Paper.
Compare U.S.-UK AGREEMENT, supra note 2, at 10 (dated Oct. 2019), with U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra
note 9, at 1 (dated Apr. 2019).
299. E.g., Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the U.S. Presentation to the
Committee Against Torture, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 12, 2014), https:// obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/thepress- office/ 2014/11/12/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-us-presentation-committee-a
(announcing changes to the U.S. government’s interpretation of an international agreement). But see
Rahim Moloo, Changing Times, Changing Obligations? The Interpretation of Treaties Over Time, 106
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 261, 263 (2012) (“If the parties engage in consistent conduct over a long period
of time, thereby demonstrating agreement as to the interpretation of the treaty, that definition may become
entrenched and may make it difficult to demonstrate that an evolved interpretation is permissible.”).
300. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 306 (AM. L. INST. 2018); see also,
e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32–36 (1982) (treating an executive agreement as equivalent to a
treaty for the purposes of statutory interpretation). While courts normally give “great weight” to the
interpretation of the U.S. executive of an international agreement, id. § 152, that principle may have less
force here, where the United States’ interpretation appears to conflict with that given by its other treaty
partner. See also supra note 227; cf. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982)
(“When the parties to a treaty both agree as to the meaning of a treaty provision, and that interpretation
follows from the clear treaty language, we must, absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence, defer to
that interpretation.”).
301. See U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 5, 14.
302. See supra Part IV.A(2).
303. See U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 4–5; UK EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note
27, ¶ 7.
304. U.S. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 8.
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(2) Expanded Jurisdiction May Be Possible Without Any New Statutory
Authority
Once the U.S.-UK Agreement comes into force, U.S. law enforcement
may be able to make use of its public international law benefit—expanding
jurisdiction to issue SCA requests to foreign service providers previously
beyond its scope305—without any new statutory authority.306 U.S. law also
applies a “presumption against extraterritoriality.”307 It is commonly
believed that, although the U.S. Congress has the authority to enact
extraterritorial legislation,308 it has declined to do so with the SCA and, as a
result, its scope extends only to service providers operating within U.S.
territory: indeed, the United States itself took this position during the
Microsoft Ireland litigation.309 In a largely overlooked comment during that
dispute, however, Judge Raggi—dissenting from the Second Circuit’s denial
of rehearing en banc—suggested that whether the SCA could be used to
compel disclosure from “foreign service providers” (otherwise) within U.S.
personal jurisdiction was an open question.310 In any event, the territoriality
of the SCA should be revisited following enactment of the CLOUD Act and
its SCA amendments.311 The CLOUD Act’s reciprocity requirement for
agreements made under it requires foreign states to remove restrictions on
“service providers, including providers subject to United States
jurisdiction.”312 Here, “including” appears redundant if this amendment were
intended to be limited to providers independently subject to U.S.
jurisdiction.313 The CLOUD Act also introduced a new enhanced comity test
305. See infra Part III.B.
306. Contra supra notes 76–83 (noting the U.S. position that its jurisdiction over service providers
have not changed under the CLOUD Act or agreements made under it).
307. See supra note 188. See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255
(2010) (noting that federal laws are presumed to have only domestic application).
308. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 404 (AM. L. INST. 2018).
309. The United States conceded the territoriality of the SCA in Microsoft Ireland. Matter of
Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197,
210–20, 210 n.19 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138
S. Ct. 1186 (2018). Multiple other district courts have agreed with this interpretation. See In re Search of
Info. Associated with Accounts Identified as [redacted]@gmail.com, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1068 (C.D.
Cal. 2017) (“[A]ll the decisions [subsequent to Microsoft Ireland] agree, and the Government concedes,
that the SCA is not extraterritorial.”).
310. Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp, 855 F.3d 53, 74 (2d Cir. 2017) (Raggi J., dissenting) (“When such a case comes before us, we can
certainly consider whether a court with personal jurisdiction over the foreign service provider can issue
a § 2703(a) warrant compelling it to disclose in the United States communications stored abroad.”).
311. See supra text accompanying notes 33–43.
312. CLOUD Act § 105(b), 18 U.S.C. 2523(b)(4)(i) (2018) (emphasis added).
313. See generally Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (applying an assumption that
when Congress uses terms “it intend[s] each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning”). This
new statutory language could, instead, have simply read “service providers subject to United States
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into the SCA that expressly extends to “foreign communications service
providers,” enabling objections from them in certain circumstances where an
SCA request would breach the laws of another CLOUD Act regime member
state.314 This language appears to make sense only if SCA requests may now
reach foreign service providers.315 The SCA may therefore already have
extraterritorial force.
There may be alternative bases on which U.S. law enforcement could
issue U.S.-UK Agreement requests to UK service providers. For example,
although U.S. courts have overwhelmingly held—prior to the above
amendments—that the SCA (and Wiretap Act) lack extraterritorial force,316
“extraterritoriality” has a distinct and narrow meaning under U.S. law.317
Most courts consider an SCA request to be territorial so long as the provider
discloses data within U.S. territory, regardless of where it was retrieved
from.318 They have also adopted a “listening post” theory, by which wiretaps
will not be extraterritorial so long as the U.S. agent is listening within U.S.
territory,319 even if the intercept is otherwise entirely foreign.320 If methods
jurisdiction” if Congress’s intention were not to enable expanded jurisdiction.
314. CLOUD Act § 103(b),18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2) (2018) (“A provider of electronic communication
service to the public or remote computing service, including a foreign electronic communication service
or remote computing service, that is being required to disclose pursuant to legal process issued under this
section the contents of a wire or electronic communication of a subscriber or customer, may file a motion
to modify or quash the legal process . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also 5 E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET
LAW § 49.16, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2020) (recognizing that this new comity mechanism
extends to foreign service providers); supra note 244.
315. See also, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 718 (1st Cir. 2014) (similarly concluding
that legislation that “explicitly applies to transmission between the United States and a foreign country”
was extraterritorial).
316. E.g., In re Search of Info. Associated with Accts. Identified as [redacted]@gmail.com, 268 F.
Supp. 3d 1060, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (concluding that the SCA lacks extraterritorial force); Huff v.
Spaw, 794 F.3d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that the Wiretap Act lacks extraterritorial force)
(internal citations omitted).
317. See Jennifer Daskal, supra note 194, at 354–65 (2015) (elaborating on the U.S. law approach
to extraterritoriality in relation to territorial warrant authority).
318. In re Search Warrant Issued to Google, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 3d. 1268, 1271–72 (N.D. Ala. 2017);
In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., No. 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391, at *3–4 (D.N.J. July 10, 2017);
c.f. In re Search a Certain E-Mail Account, 829 F.3d 197, 219–21 (2d. Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded
sub nom. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
319. United States v. Jackson, 849 F.3d 540, 551–52 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v. Rodriguez, 968
F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992); see Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1491, 1495, 1499 (2018) (assuming,
without deciding the correctness of this jurisprudence, that a wiretap falls within a District Court’s
territorial jurisdiction so long as the “listening post” is within that jurisdiction).
320. United States v. Rodriguez-Serna, No. 18cr3739 WQH, 2019 WL 4214389 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5,
2019); United States v. Cano-Flores, 796 F.3d 83, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2015); United States v. Cosme, No.
10CR3044 WQH, 2011 WL 3740337 (S.D. Cal. 2011); Daskal, Correcting the Record, supra note 90.
Contra United States v. Caro, No. CR 12-964-DMG, 2015 WL 13358234, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015)
(“[I]n order for the Government to intercept a call at a listening post located within the United States, the
call would have to access a cellular tower on the United States network.”).
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were established to enable UK service providers to disclose or route data
through U.S. territory in response to SCA or Wiretap Act orders, these orders
may therefore be within the scope of these statutes.321 This method does,
however, likely rely on the willing cooperation of these providers.
Alternatively, the territorial nature of these statutes may theoretically offer
U.S. law enforcement greater freedom here. Responding to a claim that
extraterritorial U.S. law enforcement surveillance breached the Wiretap Act,
the D.C. Circuit stated that this “reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of
the role of the statute,”322 adding, “if [the Wiretap Act] does not apply
extraterritorially, then government surveillance outside the United States is
unconstrained, not forbidden, by [its terms].”323 Albert Gidari has therefore
argued that a U.S. court may conceivably authorize such a wiretap under the
U.S.-UK Agreement using “any number of lesser forms of legal process,”
which would fall short of the protections the Wiretap Act mandates.324
Precisely the same reasoning would apply to SCA orders.
V. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS AND LINGERING QUESTIONS
This article has sought to inform the international community and
others about the benefits and implications of direct access mechanisms,
including but not limited to CLOUD Act agreements. Two main conclusions
emerge. First, direct access mechanisms offer substantial international law
benefits—at least in theory. Not only do they minimize conflicts—the main
321. See Albert Gidari, More Questions About the CLOUD Act and the US-UK Agreement – Can
the US Direct UK Providers to Wiretap Their Users in Third Countries?, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y
(Nov. 13, 2019, 11:20 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2019/11/more-questions-about-cloud-actand -us-uk-agreement-can-us-direct-uk-providers-wiretap (arguing that the “listening post” approach to
wiretap interception could potentially provide a rationale for U.S. interception of foreign transmissions).
322. United States v. Vega, 826 F.3d 514, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Chavez, 416
U.S. 580, 580 (1974)).
323. Vega, 826 F.3d at 541; see Gidari, supra note 321 (“Said another way, if the wiretap is
extraterritorial, there is no Wiretap Act constraint in doing it.”); see also United States v. Lugo Morales,
No. 4:17-CR-203-ALM-KPJ, 2019 WL 1561901, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2019) (upholding a U.S.
request for data from a foreign service provider, outside the SCA’s scope, albeit on a voluntary basis).
324. Gidari, supra note 321. See generally Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–23 (2018). The legality
of this may depend on whether the request targeted U.S. persons or not. Existing authority suggests that
extraterritorial U.S. law enforcement search and seizure targeting U.S. persons must comply with only
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, not its warrant requirement. United States v.
Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 891–93 (7th Cir. 2013); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr.,
552 F.3d 157, 167–73 (2d Cir. 2008); c.f. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–35 (2001) (summarising
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement). While a “lesser form of legal process” would appear
permitted under the U.S.-UK Agreement, it may be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See U.S.UK AGREEMENT, supra note 2, arts. 1(1), 5(7)–(8) (permitting orders to be “subject to review or
oversight . . . by a court, judge, or other independent authority prior to, or in proceedings regarding,
enforcement of the order”) (emphasis added). Orders targeting non-U.S. persons would not however be
subject to the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–75 (1990).
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stated benefit touted by the United States and United Kingdom when
promoting the U.S.-UK Agreement—but they also provide states with the
opportunity to expand enforcement jurisdiction extraterritorially against new
service providers altogether.
Secondly, states should take seriously that these arrangements are
reciprocal. The extent to which any given counterparty can take advantage
of the international benefits outlined may turn on domestic law. However,
contracting states should assume that the enhanced direct access one state
gains to their counterpart’s service providers will be met with commensurate
direct access by that counterpart sovereign to the first state’s own providers.
While it is inevitable that international negotiations, including in the area of
law enforcement assistance, operate based on trust,325 this article has
attempted to “pull back the curtain” by examining the United States’
motivation and ability to directly use CLOUD Act agreements. The United
States’ statements to date, doubting that it would make much if any use of
these agreements whatsoever, should be viewed critically: the United States
has ample reasons to seek to use the U.S.-UK Agreement both to minimize
conflicts and to expand jurisdiction—and its legal ability to do so as a matter
of U.S. law appears, at minimum, far less restrained than it admits. Indeed,
despite these public statements, it is clear that the United States is now
devoting substantial resources precisely for the purposes of issuing CLOUD
Act agreement requests.326 For avoidance of doubt, while the United States’
White Paper and similar statements are regrettable, there is nothing
necessarily objectionable about the United States’ motivation or ability to
exercise such jurisdiction: it is, after all, precisely what the U.S.-UK
Agreement contemplates and what the United Kingdom itself intends. States
should, however, enter negotiations on the assumption that the reciprocity of
these mechanisms matters.
A number of lingering questions remain. First, while this article’s
primary audience is foreign states operating on the international plane, its
U.S., UK and EU law analysis highlights several issues for further domestic
consideration. For the United States, the almost entirely unsettled nature of
personal jurisdiction, both generally and in relation to the Fifth Amendment
specifically, invites further study. Across the Atlantic, the UK’s attempts to
reform data protection law—particularly in a way that enables them to
comply with the U.S.-UK Agreement’s obligation to lift blocking statutes—
will no doubt require extensive further consideration, including with regard
to the ongoing relevance of the GDPR for service providers and others

325. See BOISTER, supra note 44, at 331–32.
326. See supra notes 224–225.
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operating in the United Kingdom. This is likely to be merely one of a host of
ongoing difficult legal issues resulting from Brexit that the United Kingdom
(and the EU) will need to grapple with in the years ahead.
Much more analysis as to the benefits, risks, and operation of direct
access mechanisms is also required. A particularly pressing task is unpacking
further the consequences of reciprocity in the context of direct access. In at
least some circumstances, allowing foreign state law enforcement direct
access to compel data from domestic service providers may risk liability for
a contracting state under international human rights law, as well as
equivalent domestic provisions.327 Equally, the extent to which bilateral
direct access mechanisms can offer any long-term solution to the conflicts of
law issues service providers increasingly face is unclear and worthy of
further consideration. There is reason to doubt the ability of bilateral
mechanisms to resolve what are, essentially, multilateral conflicts, as the
example of the GDPR appears to indicate. A close eye should be kept on the
developing EU and Budapest Convention proposals,328 as well as a potential
nascent United Nations treaty.329 Overall, given the impact of reciprocity,
coupled with these uncertainties, states should approach CLOUD Act
agreements and similar mechanisms with caution.

327. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 107, at 99.
328. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 26.
329. See, e.g., Deborah Brown, Cybercrime is Dangerous, but a New UN Treaty Could Be Worse
for Rights, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 13, 2021), https://www. justsecurity. org/ 77756/cybercrime-isdangerous- but-a-new-un-treaty-could-be-worse-for-rights/ (expressing concerns that this proposed
instrument may lead to foreign governments improperly gaining “direct access to massive amounts of
information collected and stored by private companies”).

